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Introduction
The object of this research is to estimate a time series, starting in 1979, for the value of
in-ground oil reserves and natural gas reserves in the United States. Relatively good statistics
exist for the physical quantities. (Regrettably, they will now be compiled only in alternate
years.) Our task is to estimate the unit values. We focus mainly on data from the mid 1980s to
the end of 1994.
Such a series would have several uses. First, it would provide information about the
national wealth, which includes mineral reserves. About 72 percent of mineral value added in
1987 was oil and natural gas. [Census of Mineral Industries] The U.S. Government itself owns
land which includes large reserves. An estimate made a decade ago (Boskin et al [1985]) for the
value of its mineral holdings is around $900 billion.' We have a check on this below. And
recently the BEA bemoaned the lack of reserve price data. [1994 Survey of Current Business]
Second, there is much interest in the calculation of national income and product which
makes full allowance for the consumption of minerals (as well as for other "externalities").
Given the series of oil and gas reserve values, capital consumption of minerals will appear as the
difference in reserve value from the beginning to the end of the year. This difference could then
be partitioned into the difference in physical amount held and the difference in the unit value.
Third, there is much interest in the condition and even the survival of the oil and gas
industries in the United States. The value of an in-ground unit (compared with its reproduction
cost) is the crucial fact. There is little sense in any value "per barrel of oil equivalent." A rough
* The authors acknowledge sterling research assistance from Charles Hadlock, Narasimha Rao, and Kevin
Wellenius, all with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We thank Robert Caldwell, John Lohrenz,
Stephen McDonald and James Smith for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1 This assumes oil and gas prices would rise at a real annual rate of 3 per cent, and the analysis related to
total resources, including prospective reserves.
thermal equivalent is 5.5 mcf of gas per barrel of oil. [Monthly Energy Review, Appendix Tables
A4, A6] But the annual average wellhead price of crude oil has during 1984-1994 averaged
about nine times the price of gas, with a standard deviation of 1.5. [Ibid.] More important, the
industries are diverging. Oil production continues to decline, and supply is becoming more
scarce in the strict economic sense of the supply curve moving leftward. (Bradley & Watkins
[1994]; Adelman [1995]) This has not been true of gas, where production continues to grow and
reserves have been maintained approximately constant. For oil, value changes reflect worldwide
oil price expectations. For gas, value changes reflect North America gas price expectations. The
trends are consistently different. (See below, IV-2, "Price Expectations.")
Method We aim to estimate the unit reserve values from actual transactions -- sales of oil and
gas reserve properties -- during a given year. These unit values reflect the expectations and
forecasts of the buyers and sellers, operators and investors, in practice. Higher expected returns
should be reflected in higher reserve values in relation to current prices.
The sales are mainly of developed reserves, though inclusion of undeveloped acreage
undoubtedly has an effect on the price. Thus the "true" price of a developed barrel or mcf may
be somewhat higher than what we reckon, and of course undeveloped acreage increases the
dispersion of values. Our results taken in conjunction with estimates of development costs per
barrel or per mcf allow an estimate of the value of an undeveloped barrel or mcf.2
The data base includes all transactions which The Scotia Group have been able to locate
and record, from the start of 1979 through the end of 1994. By its nature, such a record is
incomplete. Moreover, each individual transaction must be "purged" of non-cash liabilities
incurred, or non-reserve assets included, for example a share of a pipeline or refinery. There is
not only the underlying variability in the transaction values, but also possible errors and non-
comparability in the definition of reserves, and in the non-reserve assets or liabilities "purged."
Also, we have found significant regional variations in unit values and in other aspects of
transactions. Hence changes in the mix of transaction types is another source of variability
between years.
The basic statistical method is that of least squares regression. We know of no other way
to break out the separate values of oil and natural gas in any given property. However, enough
transactions solely relate to oil reserves ("pure oil") or solely to gas reserves ("pure gas") to
provide a valuable control on the regression results.
2 A calculation not pursued in the paper.
We regard this as in the nature of an interim report on a continuing inquiry. Our
treatment is aimed to show the discrepancies and unsettled problems at each step. Nevertheless,
we do not believe that the true results would differ materially from those of the following Table.
We remind the reader that each item should be multiplied by some 1.3 to approximate the social
rather than private value of the asset, or of the gain or loss of value. (See below, "U.S.
Government holdings.")
1992 1993 1994
End-of-year proved reserves
Crude oil (B barrels) 23.7 23.0 22.5
Natural gas (T cu ft) 165.0 162.4 163.8
Market value per unit in situ
Crude oil ($/barrel) 3.61 4.00 4.84
Natural Gas ($/mcf) 0.65 0.82 0.76
Total market value ($ B)
Crude oil 85.6 92.0 108.9
Natural gas 107.2 133.2 124.5
Total 192.8 225.2 233.4
1993 change 1994 change
($ B) ($ B)
(capital (capital
consumption consumption
allowance) allowance)
Value differences over previous year
Crude oil ------ +6.4 +16.9
Natural gas ------ +26.0 -8.7
Weighted: 1992 prices
Crude oil --- -2.5 -1.8
Natural gas ------ -1.7 +0.9
Weighted: 1993 prices
Crude oil ------ -2.8 -2.0
Natural gas ------ -2.1 +1.2
Weighted: 1994 prices
Crude oil ------ -3.4 -2.4
Natural gas ------ -2.0 +1.1
The total value in current dollars of developed oil and gas reserves is in the neighborhood of
$233 [$296] billion (bracketed figures are social values). The value in 1993 prices decreased in
1994 by about $0.8 [$1.0] billion. 3
The excess of social over private values There is a downward bias in our estimates.
The data show the value of the reserve to the private owner, which mainly depends on the price
3 Reserve quantities are from EIA publications; in situ values are from Table B-2b, Appendix B; weighted
changes apply given prices to quantity changes in reserves.
he expects to receive, net of expenses he expects to incur. The total of these expenses has long
been quite constant around 0.35 of the gross wellhead price. Operating costs and royalties
payable to land owners (public and private) are each about 0.15 of the price. The .05 remainder
is non-income taxes. The royalties are not costs but transfer payments, a share of profits. If we
assume that half of the taxes are payment for services (police and fire protection, etc.), then
about 0.175 of the gross wellhead price is a transfer payment. Hence the true social value of the
reserve is probably about 1.27 times i.e. (0.650+0.175)/0.650 the private value which we record.
Our detailed calculations below are aimed at calculating private values. For purposes of national
income accounting, we need to add 27 percent. Note here we assume that the wellhead price to
cost ratios would hold equally for the in situ values of reserves. 4
U.S. Government holdings We can also calculate approximately the value of the U.S.
Government interest. Current oil and gas production on Federal offshore and onshore lands is
roughly one-fourth of the national totals [API, Basic Petroleum Data Book, vol. 13, no. 3, tables
IV-6 and XI-18].
The Federal Government receives as royalty 0.155 of the gross wellhead price for
production from its lands. As just noted, the net to the owner has long been around 0.65 of the
wellhead price. Therefore the Federal interest per barrel is 0.155/0.65 = 0.2385 of the owner's
interest. The value to the private owners of all oil and gas reserves was estimated as $233 billion
at the end of 1994. The U.S. Government had a share in one-fourth of the reserves, in which
portion its interest was worth 0.2385 of an owner's interest. Hence the total value of the
Government's oil and gas holdings was $233 x 0.25 x 0.2385 = $13.9 billion. The U.S.
Government's share constitutes a large part of the social-private discrepancy noted earlier. 5
This makes no allowance for undiscovered oil and gas on Federal lands. During 1954-
1991, bonus payments for permission to drill and explore in Federal waters totaled $56.2 billion,
compared with royalties of $44.9 billion. But the ratio has fluctuated enormously. In 1974,
bonuses were 9.4 times royalties; in the latest year of available data, bonuses were 0.037 times
royalties, a spread of about 254 times the lower figure. [API, Basic Petroleum Data Book, vol.
15, no. 1, Tables IV-6, XI-10] Following the oil price crash, in 1986-1992, the annual average
bonus payment was $514 million. If we suppose this to be capitalized income, the implication is
that total USG rent on the value of the government hydrocarbon holdings exceeds that
4 To the extent the reserve values include elements that go beyond expected net present values ("goodwill,"
strategic factors, option values and the like), the assumption would not hold.
5 The Government also holds separate equity interests in the Elk Hills reserves and in the strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR). These interests are excluded from our calculation.
represented by its royalty share. We do not attempt to translate this additional rent into an
amount per unit of reserve.
Our report is organized in five main sections.
primary regression results are discussed in Section II.
tests performed. Section IV concerns the calculation
expectations embedded in reserve prices. Concluding
Appendices provide various details.
Section I reviews the basic data. The
Section III reports on certain statistical
of Hotelling Values and implicit price
remarks are made in Section V. Four
I. Review of Basic Transaction Data
First, we comment on the nature of the Scotia Group transaction data. Second, we
examine the Scotia data series.
1. The Scotia Group Data Base6
The information in the data base is collected entirely from sources in the public domain.
The version of the data base used has over 3,500 transactions of which 50 per cent have
transaction price data and about 25 per cent have both prices and reserve information -- the
transactions on which we focus.
Some transactions involve non-reserve assets such as pipelines, plants and equipment,
goodwill, strategic elements and the like.7 Where values of tangible ancillary assets are known,
they have been subtracted from the purchase price; where debt is assumed by the purchaser, its
value is added. The resulting transaction values are referred to as 'adjusted prices' in the Scotia
data base.
Reserves are reported in millions of barrels of oil (mmbbls) and billions of cubic feet of
gas (bcf). Producing rates, where available, are reported in thousands of barrels per day of oil
(mb/d) and millions of cubic feet of gas per day (mmcf/d). Reserves are treated as proven,
developed and on production -- unless there were additional information (see below). It is quite
common for buyer and seller to differ in their reserve assessments, even for proved reserves.
Where such discrepancies arise, buyers figures are used. There is no information on expected
reserve appreciation that may underlie a given transaction.
International and Canadian transactions are excluded. Some transactions are reported in
terms of equivalent volumes of oil and gas, but the conversion factors are unknown: individual
volumes cannot be derived. The data for some transactions are incomplete.
The transaction information often allows classification among various types. Buyer and
seller categories include: majors; independents; subsidiaries (companies which are subsidiaries
of non-oil parent companies and service companies); individuals (buyer or seller was an
individual, not corporate); funds (income or drilling funds or limited partnerships); and foreign
(foreign companies or US subsidiaries of foreign companies).
6 See The Scotia Group Documentation "Description and Discussion of the Database" Mimeo, January 1995.
7 "Strategic" acquisitions, especially, may involve significant goodwill; Robert Caldwell suggests the
Chevron/Tenneco and Enserch/Dalen acquisitions as good examples.
Transactions also were classified according to corporate mergers and property sales
(mainly oil and gas properties). The data base generally excludes stock transactions because
reserves cannot be identified, but some notable stock deals are included.
Payment types distinguished include transactions consisting mainly of cash, mainly of
stock, or combined (cash, stock or debt).
Details are given below. However, many transactions provide nothing other than the
basic data on the purchase price and the reserves involved. There is no implication, then, that the
categories mentioned above are identified for every transaction.
The assumption that the reserves changing hands are proved, developed and producing is
not always true. There is some information on producing and non-producing properties. The
latter may well include reserves normally classified as proved undeveloped, proved developed
not producing, probable or possible. Hence where information mentions non-producing reserves,
this can embrace possible or probable reserves, that is, prospective reserves. Moreover, some
companies will report attractive reserve figures to impress the financial community. All this
means that the reserve figures reported in transactions are subject to a considerable band of
uncertainty.
Various regions are identified for later years in the period examined. The regional
designations are listed in the Scotia Documentation (op cit., p13), and also referred to later in this
Report.
2. Description of Transaction Data
Information on those transactions that list reserve data is brought together in the 'A' series
of Tables compiled in Appendix A, to which we refer the reader for full details.
The first series of Tables (Tables A-i through A-9) descr ibe the transaction 'value' and
'volume' data. The total number of transactions providing usable data were 959, over the period
1979 to 1994 inclusive. The bulk (83%) were from 1987 onwards. Of the overall total, 194
transactions related purely to the sale of oil reserves (20%) and 176 purely to sales of gas
reserves (18%). All other transactions involved the joint sale of oil and gas reserves. We also
had some limited regional data, mainly for the years after 1988. Three regions were identified as
providing a sufficient sample size: Texas, Louisiana and Gulf offshore; the Rocky Mountain
States and New Mexico; and centrally located States (see below for more details on the regions).
a. Outliers
Annual data on the number of observations selected are shown in Table A-1. Calculation
of unit values of reserves (the in situ price per barrel or per mcf) for the 'pure' transactions
showed that certain values could be only seen as too high or too low in relation to apparent
market values. It is probable that such transactions reflected special terms of sale such as
"goodwill," or lack of information on the nature of the property exchanged, or even erroneous
data. Inclusion of such transactions in the sample would distort the market conditions we are
trying to discern.
Accordingly we eliminated all 'pure' transactions where the calculated reserve price was
more than two standard deviations from the mean value for the relevant year. We also excluded
any 'pure' values that appeared unreasonably low (below 10 cents per mcf or per barrel of
reserve).
In the case of transactions involving both oil and gas reserves -- what we term 'mixed'
transactions -- our criterion for elimination was where the actual transaction value was more
than two standard deviations away from the fitted value obtained from the regression equation
for all transactions in a given year (see Section II).
The outliers so excluded are listed in Table A-2; they total 80 transactions. While the
number of outliers is small -- a mere 8 per cent of the total observation set -- they are
influential. Hence their exclusion does materially affect the sample. The number of
observations after exclusion of the outliers is shown in Table A-3.
b. Summary Statistics
The summary statistics in Table A-4 for values of all transactions (including outliers)
shows a considerable spread in the mean values, especially in the earlier years. The latter is in
part a reflection of the smaller number of observations, which accentuates the impact of large (or
small) transactions. Beyond 1988, the mean transaction values settle down at around $40
million, except for about $30 million in 1990 and 1991.
The distribution of the transaction value observations for virtually all years is skewed to
the left: smaller transaction values predominate. The medians are appreciably less than the
means. Not surprisingly, Normality is strongly rejected for each year. On the other hand, only
in two years would log Normality be rejected. 8 The coefficients of variation are erratic before
1987 but are much more stable thereafter.
Much the same pattern is displayed by the summary statistics using transaction reserve
'volume' data (thermal equivalence) listed in Table A-5. Here oil reserves were converted to
billion cubic feet equivalence at a conversion factor of 1 barrel equals 5.5 million BTUs. Except
in one or two instances when the data are sparse, the distributions are all slanted to the left and
Normality is strongly rejected, while log Normality is not in about half the years.
Tables A-6 and A-7 show value and 'volume' summary statistics for all transactions but
after exclusion of outliers. Most of the outliers are large rather than small transactions. The
means are substantially reduced, but the distributions remain skewed.
The next set of tables (Tables A-8 through A- 11) focus on the 'pure' transactions for both
oil and gas. The pattern of results pretty well parallels that for the total number of observations.
The same comment applies in large measure to the regional data in Tables A-12 and A-13.
These data are confined to the years 1989 to 1993 inclusive; regional data in earlier years are too
sparse to allow meaningful calculation of statistical parameters.
The final three tables in Appendix A concern the various categories mentioned in Part 1
above: buyer type (Table A-14); deal type (Table A-15); and payment type (Table A-16).
Table A-14 shows that approaching one half (48 per cent) of the 959 total number of
observations related to purchases by independent companies. One quarter of the purchases were
by funds (including income or drilling funds, limited partnerships). Hence three quarters of the
transactions were accounted for by these two groups. Major companies were identified as buyers
in only about three percent of the total transactions. The type of buyer could not be identified for
some 14 per cent of transactions.
In terms of transaction type, Table A-15 reveals that the great bulk (82 per cent) relate to
the acquisition of individual properties. Mergers accounted for 16 per cent.
Cash was the predominant payment type at 57 per cent (Table A-16). The next largest
payment category was the combination of cash, stock and/or debt at about 8 per cent. Payment
via stock alone only accounted for 5 per cent. The undisclosed payment type here was quite
large at 30 per cent.
8 The test utilized was Shapiro-Wilk.
The significance of these categories on apparent reserve values is discussed in Section IIL
We conclude that the statistical characteristics of the transactions data are in large
measure stable across years, between hydrocarbons and among regions: they hold not only for
the aggregate but for the various breakdowns as well. The distributions are typically skewed
towards smaller transactions. Normality for the size distribution of transactions generally is
rejected. This suggests that since the underlying size distribution of oil and gas reservoirs is
heavily skewed (with log normality often adopted), the transaction data are representative of the
occurrence of the reserves in nature.
II. Regression Results
Our interest is in using the transaction data discussed in Section I to derive the price of oil
and gas reserves. In this Section we report both on values obtained from linear regressions of
'mixed' transactions and on values obtained from the simple division of 'pure' transaction values
by relevant individual reserve volumes.
The set of Tables relating to the various linear regressions run to estimate the in situ
values of oil and gas reserves are located in Appendix B. Specifically, all transaction values
were regressed on the quantity of oil reserves (in barrels) and on the quantity of natural gas
reserves (in thousands of cubic feet). The observation set used in the regressions includes not
only 'mixed' transactions but also the pure transactions (those where only oil reserves or only gas
reserves changed hands).
Theoretically, the intercept term in these regressions would be zero. No reserves sold, no
value. We ran the regressions both suppressing and including the constant term. The latter may
well attract noise in the data and also detect systematic biases. Also, a significant positive
intercept might be interpreted as affected by option values, consistent goodwill and the like. The
B-1 series of tables reviewed immediately below include all the observations; the subsequent B-2
series of tables are for when outliers are excluded. 9
1. Results with Outliers Included
Table B-la shows the results for all 15 years with the inclusion of the constant term (it
was statistically significant in six years but of varying sign). Figure 1 plots the reserve prices for
both oil and gas from 1981 to 1994. There is a great deal of variability in both the oil and gas
reserve coefficients, representing the price of reserves in barrels or mcfs, respectively.
After 1980 there is a steep decline in the price of oil reserves, probably reflecting the
emerging weakness in oil wellhead prices as the 1980s progressed. However, the fluctuations in
oil reserve prices after 1980 bear only scant relationships to shifts in wellhead prices -- as our
later analysis shows. In all years except 1993 the oil reserve coefficients are statistically
significant.
The price of natural gas reserves derived from regression coefficients also shows quite
violent fluctuations year over year, fluctuations that again do not seem to be well correlated with
9 James Smith has suggested that in the presence of errors-in-variables grouped regression techniques
could reduce bias. We have not tried this approach yet.
changes in wellhead prices (see later analysis). Without exception, all the gas reserve
coefficients are strongly significant, even including the anomalous negative value in 1979 (a year
with only six observations).
The results when the intercept term in the regression equation is suppressed are shown in
Table B-lb. They are not noticeably different from those in the preceding Table.
We have one check on the reasonability of the OLS regression estimates, namely by
making a comparison with the 'pure oil' and 'pure gas' transaction values. 10 The comparison for
oil is made in Table B-lc. The pure oil value observations are weighted volumetrically by the
barrels in each transaction for a given year. This is equivalent to summing the value of all pure
transactions in a given year and dividing by the total volumes of oil or gas reserves sold,
respectively. The ratios of the oil reserve coefficients from the regressions to the 'pure' oil unit
values differ markedly. And there is no consistency, although more often than not the regression
coefficients are lower than the 'pure' oil transactions. Only in 1981 and during the three year
interval 1988 to 1990 do the ratios approximate unity. 1
Comparisons for natural gas are shown in Table B-ld. Again there is a large spread in
the ratios of the regression values to the 'pure' values. Only in three years -- 1985, 1986 and
1994 -- were the ratios within 10 per cent of unity. And in contrast to oil, in the majority of
years the regression coefficients exceeded the 'pure' values.
We conclude that the reserve values derived from the overall sample of transactions
differ markedly in most years from the pure transaction sample.
2. Results Excluding Outliers
The next set of Tables in Appendix B looks at what happens when we exclude the
outliers. With the exception of 1981 all the oil reserve coefficients are strongly significant (see
Table B-2a, with an intercept). But their amplitude of variation, while large, is less than when
the outliers are included. Much the same comment applies to the natural gas reserve coefficients;
the only statistically insignificant value was in 1982. As for the full data set, the 1979 gas
reserve coefficient was perversely negative (even though two outliers were eliminated). Overall
10 Recall that the pure values are simply calculated by dividing the adjusted transaction value by the
relevant volume of oil and gas reserves.
11 These results are notwithstanding the fact that regression data include the 'pure' oil cases (see earlier).
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the coefficients were more stable over time. The constant term was significant in only three
years. The oil coefficients are plotted in Figure 1, those for gas are plotted in Figure 2. The
plots are shown both with and without outliers.
The regressions without the outliers were rerun with corrections for heteroscedasticity
(Table B-2b). This increased the standard errors of the coefficients in all but some of the earlier
years. Hence, many of the 't' values fell, although still remaining highly significant.
When the intercept was suppressed, as expected there were few changes in the oil and gas
reserve coefficients (Table B-2c). However the anomalous negative gas coefficient in 1979 did
become positive, while the oil coefficient in that year roughly doubled in value. 12 And there
was a big swing in the oil coefficient in 1981 compared with inclusion of the intercept. But for
all years with over 20 observations -- that is from 1983 on -- the coefficients were robust to the
absence of the intercept, particularly when the outliers are excluded (see Table B-2d).
The next Table (B-2e) summarizes the impact of the exclusion of outliers on the reserve
coefficients. The ratio of the oil and gas regression coefficients with and without the outliers is
calculated. The impact of suppressing the outliers is considerable, especially in the years before
1988. And this holds in the case of both oil and gas. The earlier years have fewer observations
and hence are more likely to be dominated by extreme values (also see Figures 1 and 2).
Table B-2f compares the oil regression values (intercept included) with the weighted pure
oil case values (outliers excluded). Over the years 1987 to 1993 (and in 1980 and 1984) the
ratios were reasonably close to unity: within about 15 per cent. This is in marked contrast to the
earlier corresponding comparison before adjustment for outliers (Table B-1c). It demonstrates
the strong influence of a few extreme values and provides more confidence in the consistency
between the regression values and the pure values, once the outliers are eliminated. The same
conclusion also applies to natural gas. There was a much closer correspondence between the gas
regression coefficient values and the 'pure' transaction values when the outliers were excluded --
especially over the years 1990 to 1994 (Table B-2g).
3. Results and Reserves Status
Information was available for certain transactions that distinguished between those where
reserves were on production and those where they were partly fallow. In the latter case the
properties may include prospective reserves normally classified as proved undeveloped,
12 The indication is that one of the outliers was an especially unprofitable sale.
developed but not on production, probable or possible. Other things equal, the in situ reserve
values for reserves on production would be expected to exceed those for dormant reserves. The
theoretical margin between two identical properties, one on production, the other not developed,
would be the development cost per unit of reserve, in the absence of any option value for the
undeveloped reserve.
We tested the proposition of such differential values using the 'pure' oil observations for
properties containing some reserves not on production, totaling 62 over the 1979 to 1993 period,
or 35 percent of the total number of pure transactions. The results are shown in Table B-3a. No
clear picture emerged. Indeed in many years the ratio of average partly non-producing property
in situ values to producing property values noticeably exceeded unity. We ascribe this result
mainly to the uncertainty associated with a small sample, the inherent variability in the
composition of transactions in any year (see later comments) and the unknown extent of the non-
producing properties in any transaction containing them.
The same comment applies to Table B-3b for the oil regression coefficients from the
mixed transactions. Here there were 357 properties identified with reserves partly not on
production, or some 40 per cent of the total. In the majority of years the price ratio of the partly
producing to producing properties exceeded unity.
The corresponding results for natural gas are reported in Tables B-3c (gas only
transactions) and Table B-3d (gas regression coefficients). The conclusion is the same as that for
oil -- there is no clear tendency for the producing reserve in situ unit values to exceed those
where the reserves were partly not on production. In fact, for pure gas transactions, only in one
year of the eight for which data are available is the ratio of in situ values of partly producing
reserves to reserves fully on production less than unity. All these results are for where outliers
are excluded and the intercept is included in the regressions.
4. Results and Regional Aspects
The final Table in Appendix B concerns regional aspects. (Table B-4a) The earlier
Tables A-1 through A-3 showed limited regional data, obtained by grouping some information
for adjacent States to create a reasonable sample size. Given variability in prices among regions,
and even more variability in the quality and nature of reservoirs and 'plays,' we would expect
changes in the regional mix of transactions potentially would have a significant impact on
average reserve values by year.
The Regions were defined as follows:
"Texas, Louisiana, Gulf," represents East Texas, Gulf Coast Texas/South Texas, South
Louisiana, Offshore Texas, Panhandle Texas, Other Texas and West Texas.
"Rockies, New Mexico," represents Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.
"Central States," represents Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska and Oklahoma. 13
Table B-4a shows the regression results (intercept included) for those years where there
are more than 12 observations for a given region (outliers excluded). These are only for the
years 1988 and beyond. The most numerous observations are for the Texas, Louisiana and
offshore Gulf aggregation. The results show considerable variety among regions. Statistical
tests on the significance of the coefficient differences are reported later.
The pattern of reserve coefficient differences among the regions has some intuitive
appeal. The oil coefficients comparison among all three regions is restricted to the years 1990
and 1993. The coefficients are highest in the Central region. Those for Texas et al and Rockies
et al are virtually the same in 1990, but the latter is appreciably less than the former in 1993. The
Central coefficients also exceed the national average coefficients. The higher values for this
region are consistent with an 'add on' pricing mechanism from the Gulf inland to a Chicago
interface with Canadian oil. However, the actual oil wellhead price relationships shown in
Appendix C, Table C-lb, only bear this out for the years 1989 to 1992 inclusive; the contrary
relationship holds for the earlier years (except 1981).14 The Rockies, New Mexico aggregation
yields lower oil prices than in the Central states for every year over the entire period (1981 to
1992).
The picture for gas shown in Table B-4a is different from that for oil. Here for each year
Texas values exceed those for the other two regions, while the Central coefficient exceeds that
for the Rockies in 1990, but not in 1993. Actual regional wellhead prices (Appendix C, Table C-
ld) show that Texas prices exceed those for the Central States in all but two years (1982, 1983),
but except for the years beyond 1988, Rockies and Nevada prices exceed those for Texas.
Natural gas price equalization mechanisms among regions are murky.
13 See The Scotia Group, op cit., p 13 for regional definitions.
14 The comparison is straightforward, without adjustment for any systematic quality differences.
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III. Results of Statistical Tests
This Section reports on the results of various statistical tests or searches for relationships
among reserve values. We start by looking at whether the rate of production as represented by
reserve to production ratios had a systematic influence on reserve prices. We then examine the
influence of wellhead prices, and of the various transaction classifications mentioned in
Section I.
1. Influence of R/P Ratios
A factor which can be expected to influence reserve values is the rate at which reserves
are produced. Evidence for such an effect is likely to be confined to cross section data. The shift
in time series data for R/P ratios is likely too gradual to reveal impacts.
Reserve to production ratios are shown in Appendix C both regionally and nationally for
oil in Table C-le and for gas in Table C-lf. For oil, each of the three regions have lower R/P
ratios than the national average; among regions the Central States have the lowest R/P ratios,
while no consistent pattern emerges between Texas and the Rockies. Other things equal, the
implication is that the in situ values of reserves in the Central region would be higher than in the
other two regions, since they are being produced more rapidly. In the case of gas, the R/P ratios
for the Central States approximate the national average; those for Texas are lower than for
Central regions, but exceed those for the Rockies.
The number of transactions for which we had R/P ratio information was small and
confined to the years 1987 to 1994. The most observations in any one year was 1993 at 32; there
were insufficient observations in 1990.
To test whether the R/P ratio affects the transaction price we performed the following
regression:
adjprice = [a0 + a2 o ]Ro + [a' + a' H,]R,
where: adjprice is the transaction price (after elimination of non reserve assets)
the 'o' superscript denotes oil
the 'g' superscript denotes gas
al and a2 are the two coefficients for each reserve being tested
R denotes reserves sold
H denotes the R/P ratio.
The regression was run without an intercept term, to conserve degrees of freedom.
The greater the R/P ratio, the lower the rate of production. The lower the rate of
production, the lower the expected price of reserves, other things equal. Hence the expected sign
of the a2 coefficient attaching to the H variable (the R/P ratio) would be negative.
In the case of oil the a 2 coefficient is negative in five of the seven years for which we had
data. But it is insignificant (whether positive or negative) in the 1990s. In the case of gas, a2 is
negative in all years and significantly so in the 1990s. Our broad conclusion is that the
transaction data do support the proposition that reserve prices would be inversely related to R/P
ratios -- and especially for natural gas in recent years.
2. Relationship Between Reserve Regression Coefficients and Wellhead Prices
Expected wellhead prices are an important determinant of reserve values. Expected
values are influenced by current and previous prices. We made a series of simple tests to see
whether the annual oil and gas regression coefficients (reserve values) calculated from the
regressions displayed any obvious relationship with current and lagged wellhead prices. We
confined the tests to a simple linear regression of oil and gas regression coefficients on an
intercept and wellhead prices, and also where the equation is forced through the origin. But in
relation to the latter we note that since reserve values are influenced by price expectations it is by
no means clear that a zero current or lagged price would indicate zero prices in the future. Hence
reserve coefficients could be positive even if wellhead prices were zero. There is, then, a
preference for retaining the intercept term, although in a strict time series context it may have
little clear meaning.
The results for oil are shown in Table C-2b and C-2c for the two sets of regressions
where the reserve price was regressed on each of contemporary wellhead prices, prices lagged
one year, and prices lagged two years. The equations were estimated both with and without an
intercept. Without the intercept we find that oil reserve prices as represented by the annual
regression coefficients are positively related to wellhead prices, whether contemporary or lagged
one or two years. But the degree of fit is modest. When included, the intercept dominates and
the wellhead price coefficient becomes trivial and insignificant; there is virtually no linear fit.
The conclusion is that forcing the line through the origin imposes some slope among a series of
points that seems little more than a scatter diagram.
The next series of Tables (Tables C-3b and C-3c) applied the same regression analysis to
natural gas reserve coefficients and prices. Little fit was exhibited by the equations with an
intercept, whereas those with the intercept suppressed yielded reasonably high R2 values and
statistically significant coefficients of slightly over 0.5 for the various price terms, be they
contemporary or lagged prices. Other things equal, this suggested that about one half of any
change in natural gas wellhead prices would be translated into in situ values.
The finding that changes in field prices do seem to have an appreciable influence on
estimates of reserve prices for natural gas but not for oil is of interest in relation to the analysis in
Section IV. Here, we found positive expected rates of growth in wellhead prices embedded in
gas reserve prices, not in oil reserve prices.
3. Small and Large Transactions
The transaction data also permitted some limited tests on whether transaction size
affected the apparent price of reserves. To conduct the tests the transactions were simply divided
between small and large by the respective annual medians. One proposition here is that in so far
as large transactions are associated with a large reserve volumes, in situ prices might be
favorably affected by economies of scale and higher well productivities. 15 We did some rank
correlation tests that confirmed the close relationship between the size of transactions values and
the 'volume' of oil and gas reserves in combination as measured by thermal equivalence. 16
Tests were confined to the six years 1989 to 1994, years with sufficient data. The results
of regressing reserve prices on the twofold division of transaction size are shown in Tables C-4a
and C-4b. They are mixed for both oil and gas. The oil coefficients are lower for large
transactions for the years 1991 through 1994, but not for 1989 and 1990. Gas coefficients are
higher for large transactions in 1990, 1991 and 1993, but not in the other three years. In short,
the results show no systematic relationship between transaction sizes and reserve prices.
Chow tests were also performed on the 'small' and 'large' transaction reserve regression
coefficients. The hypothesis that the coefficients were drawn from the same population could
not be rejected. This result has implications for whether Normality can be assumed for the
distribution of reserve prices, given the preponderance of small transactions (log normality in
many instances -- see Section I). For example, if smaller transactions were associated with
15 However, well productivities are more influenced by reserve 'density' -- reserves per acre -- than by
the magnitude of the reserve itself.
16 The test used was the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test.
lower in situ reserve prices per barrel or per mcf, then the implicit distribution of reserve prices
would be skewed. No such skewness emerges from the analysis.
4. Tests Among Other Categories
The description of the data in Section I provided information on some other data
classifications. Tests for differences between the dominant component of a given category and
the remaining components (in aggregate) revealed the following. 17
a) Type of Buyer - Independent vs. Other
The data related to the years 1987 to 1994. For the oil reserve coefficients from the
regressions, the Chow test upheld equality of them between independent and other sellers in the
earlier half of the period. But equality was rejected in the latter half. In other words, the
hypothesis that the oil reserve coefficients according to seller category were drawn from the
same population was rejected for the years 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1994. A similar result was
achieved for the gas reserve coefficients, but there was no apparent time pattern of rejection of
equality of coefficients. The same comment as for gas applies to the Chow tests for the oil and
gas reserve coefficients in combination. The results are summarized below.
Equal values: independent vs. other buyers
Note: Rejection is at least at the 10% level.
Many could be rejected using a tighter criterion.
17 The tests had three components: test of the null hypothesis of no difference between the oil coefficients
of the category and the oil coefficient of the remainder; test of the null hypothesis of no difference
between the gas coefficient of the category and the gas coefficient of the remainder; and test for the joint
null hypothesis of the respective oil and gas coefficients.
Year Oil Alone Gas Alone Aggregate
Equation
1987 Not Rejected Rejected Rejected
1988 Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
1989 Not Rejected Rejected Not Rejected
1990 Rejected Not Rejected Rejected
1991 Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
1992 Rejected Rejected Rejected
1993 Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
1994 Rejected Rejected Rejected
In the years where equality was rejected, either for oil or gas alone or for the sample as a whole,
the respective coefficients (imputed reserve prices) are given below. In all cases where equality
of gas reserve prices was rejected, transactions involving 'independent' buyers implied a lower
reserve price. When equality of oil reserve prices was rejected, there is no such pattern of
consistently higher or lower prices by one of the two groups.
Reserve Coefficients for Years When Equality was Rejected
Year Oil Gas Obs
$/bbl $/mcf
Independent Other Independent Other
1987 0.938 1.489 50
1989 0.615 0.975 98
1990 6.099 4.556 153
1992 2.864 4.493 0.649 0.772 85
1993 4.378 2.707 122
1994 2.936 5.269 0.540 0.808 84
b) Type of Deal - Property vs. Other
The data only permitted tests for the three years 1989, 1990 and 1993. Using the Chow
test, equality of oil, gas and combined coefficients was rejected in all years except for oil in
1993: see the following summary.
Note: Rejection is at least at the 10 percent level.
For transactions where equality of coefficients (imputed reserve prices) was rejected, the
regression coefficients are given below.
Reserve Coefficients for Years When Equality was Rejected
Year Oil Gas Obs
$/bbl $/mcf
Property Other Property Other
1989 6.111 3.283 0.982 0.648 98
1990 4.563 9.809 0.884 0.805 153
1993 0.851 0.706 122
Year Oil Alone Gas Alone Aggregate
Equation
1989 Rejected Rejected Rejected
1990 Rejected Rejected Rejected
1993 Not Rejected Rejected Rejected
Transactions involving property implied consistently higher gas reserve prices. No such pattern
is discerned for the price of oil reserves.
c) Type of Payment - Cash vs. Other
The Chow test was applied for regressions for the years 1987 to 1994 inclusive. For
roughly half the years equality of coefficients was rejected for both oil and gas coefficients
individually and in combination -- see below.
Year Oil Alone Gas Alone Aggregate
Equation
1987 Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
1988 Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
1989 Rejected Not Rejected Rejected
1990 Rejected Rejected Rejected
1991 Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
1992 Rejected Rejected Rejected
1993 Not Rejected Rejected Rejected
1994 Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected
Note: Rejection is at least at the 10% level.
Most years here were rejected at the 1% level.
For the transactions in which equality of reserve prices was rejected, the regression coefficients
are given below. In all cases where equality was rejected, the imputed gas reserve prices were
consistently higher for transactions involving cash payment. No identifiable trend is seen for oil
reserve prices.
Reserve Coefficients for Years When Equality was Rejected
Year Oil Gas Obs
Cash Other Cash Other
1989 6.264 3.143 98
1990 4.563 6.219 0.900 0.815 153
1992 2.890 3.867 0.887 0.629 85
1993 11I 110.951 0.674 122
In summary: the impact on reserve prices of the three types of transactions discussed
above, of regional variations, and of rate of production suggest the following conclusion. Unless
the mix of transactions by these categories were reasonably constant, some of the variation in
estimates of reserve prices among years will reflect compositional shifts in transaction types.
Hence caution has to be exercised in any interpretation of temporal trends in estimated reserve
prices. This seems to apply to a greater degree to gas than to oil reserve prices.
IV. Reserve Prices, Hotelling Values, and Price Expectations
The Hotelling Valuation Principle sees the market value of a mineral in the ground at any
point in time as equal to the net price per unit of production that prevails at that time. (Miller
and Upton [1985]). In the first Part of this Section we relate the estimates of reserve prices
discussed in Section II to estimates of Hotelling Values. We then examine what price
expectations for oil and gas respectively may underlie the reserve prices calculated.
1. Reserve Prices and Hotelling Values -- A Comparison
Hotelling Values are the net price, which we write as:
p-c
where: p is present price of oil or gas as produced at the field (wellhead)
c is the extraction cost.
The assumption here is that title to the reserve in the transaction passes at the field gate, and that
the field is developed. To the extent the transaction includes undeveloped reserves, the value of
'c' would need to be augmented for some portion of development cost. The Hotelling Value,
accordingly, would be smaller. But the pattern of results earlier where transactions with some
undeveloped reserves were not necessarily of lower value than those for just developed reserves
obscures the picture.
We estimate national averages for the p-c values for the period 1981-1994, plus some
regional values. The oil and gas field prices used were those shown in Table C-la and C-lc,
Appendix C. Annual operating costs were based on Energy Information Administration (EIA)
data. 18 A suitable historical series for operating costs was not available. Instead, reliance was
placed on recent information.
In particular, EIA data suggested operating costs comprising lifting costs and production
taxes of $3.72 per barrel and $0.413 per mcf in 1992. These 1992 numbers were used for all
years. To the extent that operating costs were constant in real terms, the implication is that the
1992 costs will be too high in years prior to 1992. If so, the estimated Hotelling Values would
be depressed in those years. The contrary effect would be observed in 1993 and 1994.19
18 Communication from EIA, January 1995.
19 Technological improvements over time would have a countervailing effect. Also, as Stephen McDonald
points out, operating costs are infected by regulatory practice. Hotelling valuation would apply better in
practice with more wide scale reservoir unitization.
The annual Hotelling Values (HV) so estimated are shown in Tables D-la through D-le
under the column headed "Net Field Price" (column (8)). These Tables relate to the national oil
values, the 'pure' oil values, the national natural gas values, the 'pure' natural gas values, and
some regional values.
a) Oil Results
The national HVs for oil are graphed in Figure 3 for 1981 to 1994, along with the reserve
prices estimated from the regressions in Table B-2b (excluding outliers, intercept included),
Appendix B. Figure 3 shows that in all years the Hotelling Values exceeded the corresponding
reserve prices, with a particularly noticeable gap in the years prior to 1986. How significant is
the spread between them?
The standard errors of the reserve prices are given by the regression results and
reproduced in column (4) of Table D-la. This enables us to calculate how many standard
deviations the HVs are away from the reserve prices. The results are shown in Column (10) of
Table D-la. If we assume the reserve prices were normally distributed within each year, then
1.96 standard deviations would bracket 90 per cent of them. 20 It follows the results in column
(10) decisively reject the null hypothesis that the recorded differences between the HVs and
reserve prices are not statistically significant.
The same analysis as done for the oil values from the regression equation is pursued for
the 'pure' oil reserve prices and is shown in Table D-lb and graphed in Figure 4. With exception
of 1986, the HVs consistently exceed the reserve prices. The null hypothesis that the differences
are not statistically significant is rejected in all years except 1986 and 1988 (there is no result for
1982, for which there is only one observation).
Relationships between HVs and reserve prices for the limited regional data are listed in
Table D-le, Appendix D. The HVs considerably exceed the reserve prices in all instances, and
the margins are highly significant statistically.
b) Natural Gas Results
The HVs for all gas national averages are listed in Table D-lc, Appendix D, in relation to
reserve prices and displayed in Figure 5. With the exception of 1981 -- when the picture is
20 See earlier comment on relation between reserve prices and transaction size indicating that the
distribution of reserve prices would not be skewed.
clouded by vestiges of price controls -- the HVs exceed the reserve prices by a statistically
significant margin.
In contrast to the 'all gas' results, the 'pure' gas results (see Table D-ld and Figure 6)
show statistically insignificant margins between the HVs and the reserve prices in all years,
although the former consistently exceed the latter. This result reflects the high standard errors
for 'pure' gas transactions compared with the regression coefficients. 21
Regional estimates are shown in Table D-lf. For the Texas et al region the results are
ambiguous. The null hypothesis of no difference between the HVs and the reserve prices is not
rejected in 1989 and 1990 (and in 1990 the reserve price exceeds the HV). But in 1991 and 1992
the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, as it is in 1990 for both the Central and Rockies regions
(1990 was the only year for which data were available for these two areas).
2. Oil and Gas Price Expectations
Given information on field prices, production to reserve ratios and the discount rate it is
possible to estimate the implicit growth rate in wellhead prices that would be consistent with a
given reserve price [Adelman and Watkins, 1995, p.669]
Predicated on certain simplifying assumptions the general expression for the growth rate
in prices implicit in the reserve values is given by:
g=i+a {1- [(p- c)/v]} (1)
where g = annual growth rate in prices
i = discount rate
a = production / reserve ratio
p = wellhead price
c = extraction cost
v = reserve price.
For oil we need data on ao, Po, co, bo; and for gas, ag, pg, Cg, bg. 22
21 For example, in 1994 the standard error for pure gas transactions is $1 per mcf; the regression gave a
standard error of $0.03 per mcf even though the respective reserve prices at $0.76 mcf happen to be the
same.
22 For derivation of expression (1) see Adelman [1991]. If, as would be normal, p>c, the following
relationships hold: cg/ov > 0; g/ldc > 0; dg/da < 0 if p -c > v; dg/la < 0 if v > p - c.
In the case of both ao andag (the production to reserves ratio), we make a refinement to correct
for shorter than infinite reservoir life, and write 'a' in general terms as:
a = (P/R) - (P/R)2
where P/R = production to reserve ratio.
The values for field prices, p, are taken from the earlier tables (Table C-la, C-lc); the
P/R ratios are of course the inverse of the R/P ratios in Tables C-le, C-if. The discount rate
adopted was a nominal rate of 0.15. This reflects an assumed real rate of 10 per cent and
expected inflation of 5 per cent. (Adelman and Watkins [1995 p.670]).
The estimated implicit growth rates of field prices are listed in column (7) in the series of
Tables in Appendix D (Tables D-la through D-If for reserve prices from the regression that
included a constant term, Tables D-lg and Table D-lh where the intercept is suppressed). The
results are illustrated in Figure 7 (all transactions) and Figure 8 (just the 'pure' transactions), for
asset values derived from regression equations both with and without an intercept (all after
exclusion of outliers).
The results on implicit growth rates for oil and gas for all transactions are listed below.
OIL
Year Annual Expected Growth Rate in Prices
No Const. Const.
1981 -0.02 -0.27
1982 -0.10 -0.19
1983 -0.55 -0.57
1984 -0.04 -0.05
1985 -1.38 -1.57
1986 0.09 0.09
1987 -0.05 -0.02
1988 0.09 0.08
1989 0.01 0.01
1990 -0.09 -0.08
1991 0.00 0.01
1992 -0.08 -0.09
1993 -0.01 -0.01
1994 0.05 0.06
(see Tables D- a, D- g)
GAS
Year Annual Expected Growth Rate in Prices
No Const. Const.
1981 0.21 0.20
1982 -0.06 -0.14
1983 0.14 0.14
1984 0.08 0.07
1985 0.13 0.12
1986 0.04 0.03
1987 0.07 0.08
1988 0.06 0.06
1989 0.12 0.12
1990 0.10 0.10
1991 0.11 0.12
1992 0.05 0.05
1993 0.10 0.10
1994 0.07 0.07
(see Tables D-lc, D-lh)
The results reveal striking differences between oil and gas price expectations. Those for
oil are mainly negative or flat. (The high and close-fitting values for 1986 were a good forecast
for 1987.) Expectations for gas are persistently positive, but with a sharp reduction in 1992.
This pattern of variation between oil and gas price expectations is consistent with our knowledge
of industry forecasts and with results using Canadian data on sales of reserves [Adelman and
Watkins, 1995 p.670].
What sort of confidence interval might bracket these estimates of implicit growth rates?
Sensitivities could be established by using different values for the exogenous variables i, a, p and
c. However, we prefer to focus on the statistical variability in v, the reserve price, since we do
have an estimate of its variance from the regression. If we assume v does not covary with the
exogenous variables, upper and lower bounds for g can be calculated numerically as a function
of the variance of v. 23
Upper and lower bounds for the implicit growth rates resulting from inserting in equation
(1) values of plus and minus two standard errors from the estimated v are listed below. 24 The
intervals are also shown in Figure 7 (for all transactions).
23 Note that the earlier analysis of the relationship between reserve values and field prices indicated quite
weak correlation (see Section 111-2). But there was evidence that dv/ d was positive (see Section III-1).
Since dg/da < 0 if p - c > v, and dg/dv > 0, then the bounds for g would tend to be narrower than
calculated.
24The standard errors are those for the regression equation with the intercept and excluding outliers (see
Table B-2b).
OIL
Year Implicit Growth Rate in Expected Prices
Lower Bound Base Upper Bound
1981 -0.64 -0.27 0.09
1982 -0.92 -0.19 -0.02
1983 -1.00 -0.57 -0.36
1984 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01
1985 -3.23 -1.55 -0.96
1986 0.06 0.09 0.12
1987 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03
1988 0.09 0.09 0.10
1989 -0.03 0.02 0.05
1990 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08
1991 -0.02 0.01 0.02
1992 -0.14 -0.09 -0.05
1993 -0.07 -0.01 0.03
1994 0.03 0.06 0.08
GAS
Year Implicit Growth Rate in Expected Prices
Lower Bound Base Upper Bound
1981 0.11 0.20 0.22
1982 0.98 -0.14 0.04
1983 0.13 0.14 0.15
1984 0.05 0.07 0.01
1985 0.08 0.12 0.1
1986 0.01 0.03 0.0
1987 0.05 0.08 0.09
1988 0.04 0.06 0.01
1989 0.11 0.12 0.11
1990 0.1C 0.10 0.11
1991 0.11 0.12 0.12
1992 0.04 0.05 0.06
1993 0.09, 0.10 0.11
1994 0.061 0.08 0.01
Once the regression estimates become more reliable -- that is after 1985 -- the spreads in the
upper and lower bounds are typically 2 to 3 percentage points away from the base values in the
case of oil, 1 to 2 percentage points in the case of gas. None of the lower bounds for natural gas
become negative when the base value is positive, 25 whereas for oil the lower bounds do become
negative for two (1989, 1991) of the four years for which oil base values are positive. This result
reinforces our conclusion that price expectations between oil and gas were significantly different.
It is also possible that the estimates of implicit growth rates in prices include expected
cost reductions. But such technological and other improvements are more manifest at the
exploration and development stage, rather than at the production stage.
Expression (1) is derived on the assumption that the reserve price is a straightforward
function of future net cash flows. Insofar as v includes an option value, the estimates of g, the
implicit growth rate, will be exaggerated. 26 We are unable to measure the extent of any such
bias. As long as it applies equally to oil and gas reserve values our finding of the significant
differences between oil and gas price expectations remains. We also note that option values will
more likely arise in the case of undeveloped than for developed reserves already on production.
The latter situation holds for most transaction.
25The only negative base value for gas was for 1982.
26 From (1) dgldv>0.
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Reserve Price vs. Hotelling Value
All Gas Transactions
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Figure 7
Implicit Growth Rates of
Oil and Gas Wellhead Prices, All Transactions
Pure and mixed transactions, constant included in regression
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Figure 8
Implicit Growth Rates of
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V. Concluding Remarks
The results of this research paper are of interest in several ways.
1. Reserve value embraces (net) price forecast over the life of the reserve. This is
because it mainly reflects the net present value of all the production expected. The appraisal is
made by a team of engineers, geologists, bankers, economists, and investors. Their forecast may
be wrong, but it is worth serious attention.
2. The difference between the value of existing reserves on production and the cost of
finding and developing additional reserves is the governor of investment. These costs have been
calculated elsewhere for years through 1991, though the basic data end there. 27 The value: cost
comparison is a clue to whether oil or gas production is expected to increase or decrease.
3. Oil and gas reserve values must be separately calculated. There is no such thing as a
barrel of "oil equivalent." Our research broadly confirms price and production data, and industry
opinion: oil and gas industries are on a different track.
4. For oil transaction prices, there is a ramp in 1988-1991, which averaged $5.08 per
barrel, compared with a 1992-1994 average of $4.15 per barrel. This points to a realization in
the trade that an oil price hump in the 1990s -- expected by many -- was increasingly unlikely.
5. Natural gas reserve values fell after 1987. Yet the lower prices and reserve values
have drawn in enough investment to expand output slightly. The supposed "gas bubble" mainly
related to deliverability, not reserves.
6. The Hotelling Valuation Principle is that the developed reserve value is equal to the
wellhead price net of extraction costs. The HVP cannot be reconciled with the data, which show
that net prices are roughly twice in-ground values, thus confirming an old industry rule of thumb,
that value is one-third of gross wellhead price.
7. The national income needs to be adjusted for reserve accumulation or decumulation.
Our measures are based on the premise that reserves are created and consumed like all other
capital assets. There is little support for the theory that minerals are somehow unique, and that a
unit produced today ineluctably means one less available in the future. Future reserves will be
determined by future technology and costs on the one side, and future demands on the other.
27 Adelman (1992).
8. Despite the defects in our estimates of income adjustments, they are more accurate
than most measures of capital consumption, which depend on arbitrary accounting rules to
recapture original outlays over some assumed "service life." Our estimates are based on actual
market values. The income adjustment, however, is small, staying between extreme values
between +$5 billion and -$5 billion. In contrast, the annual capital consumption adjustment for
non-residential fixed assets is in the neighborhood of $650 billion.
9. The value of the (developed) mineral holdings of the U.S. Government are in the
neighborhood of $14 billion, only a small fraction of estimates not based on actual market
transaction values.
10. We believe our estimates could be improved in several ways. First, we would try to
find other sources of transactions, and some information on which to "clean out" non-reserve
assets more precisely. Second, there seems to be significant variation by type of reserve:
location, company size, reserve:production ratio, and the like. If we can normalize for these
variations, we may have better estimates over time. Third, we need more information on
operating costs to improve the estimates of net prices, which are compared with in-ground
values. Fourth, we need to examine the extent to which reserve values might incorporate option
values, 'good will' and the like. Fifth, estimates of finding costs can be made after deduction of
estimates of development costs from prices of developed reserves.
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Appendix A: Identified Transaction Data
Source for all data: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v. 8.0, January, 1995
Table A-1: Number of Identified Transactions, All Inclusive
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
YEAR TYPE BY REGION
All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas Tex. Louis., Rockies, Central Other
Gulf New Mex.
All Years 959 194 176 256 83 76 544
1979 6 0 0 0 0 0 6
1980 13 3 2 0 2 1 10
1981 9 3 0 2 0 1 6
1982 15 1 0 2 1 0 12
1983 24 2 1 4 2 1 17
1984 34 8 1 5 4 2 23
1985 38 7 6 2 0 3 33
1986 27 3 3 7 2 3 15
1987 52 12 5 8 4 6 34
1988 66 14 9 9 0 2 55
1989 104 19 18 25 5 5 69
1990 160 38 30 57 12 19 72
1991 100 20 19 38 9 5 48
1992 91 19 20 35 10 5 41
1993 127 29 30 27 24 14 62
1994 93 16 32 35 8 9 41
Table A-2: Number of Outliers 24
YEAR TYPE BY REGION
All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas Tex. Louis., Rockies, New Central Other
Gulf Mex.
All Years 80 17 10 16 2 1 61
1979 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1980 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
1981 2 1 0 0 0 0 2
1982 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
1983 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
1984 4 1 0 1 0 0 3
1985 15 2 4 1 0 0 14
1986 4 0 1 1 0 0 3
1987 2 1 0 0 0 0 2
1988 6 2 1 2 0 0 4
1989 6 1 0 2 0 0 4
1990 7 2 1 3 0 0 4
1991 4 1 0 2 0 0 2
1992 6 2 0 2 1 0 3
1993 5 1 1 1 1 0 3
1994 9 3 2 1 0 1 7
240utliers are defined as follows:
* For pure transactions, the actual reserve price was more than two standard deviations from the mean
for that year, or was too small (less than 10 cents per barrel or per mcf).
* For mixed transactions, the actual transaction value was more than two standard deviations away from
the fitted value.
Note: given the much smaller sample prior to 1985, the outlier criterion for pre-1985 transactions was three
standard deviations from the respective means of fitted values.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table A-3: Number of Identified Transactions, Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
YEAR TYPE BY REGION
All Types Pure Oil Pure Gas Tex, Louis., Rockies, New Central Other
Gulf Mex.
All Years 879 177 166 240 81 75 483
1979 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
1980 10 3 2 0 2 1 7
1981 7 2 0 2 0 1 4
1982 13 1 0 2 1 0 10
1983 21 2 1 4 2 1 14
1984 30 7 1 4 4 2 20
1985 23 5 2 1 0 3 19
1986 23 3 2 6 2 3 12
1987 50 11 5 8 4 6 32
1988 60 12 8 7 0 2 51
1989 98 18 18 23 5 5 65
1990 153 36 29 54 12 19 68
1991 96 19 19 36 9 5 46
1992 85 17 20 33 9 5 38
1993 122 28 29 26 23 14 59
1994 84 13 30 34 8 8 34
Table A-4: Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, All Transactions
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 2 5  # Obs.
$mm $mm $nun Variation
All Years 108.34 698.44 8.30 6.41 13.192 202.84 Rejected 959
1979 687..00 1459.81 21.40 2.12 1.746 4.12 Rejected 6
1980 271.77 640.23 33.40 2.36 2.745 9.14 Not Rejected 13
1981 117.63 192.85 37.50 1.64 2.009 5.57 Not Rejected 9
1982 475.05 1512.72 44.00 3.19 3.446 12.95 Not Rejected 15
1983 100.39 215.06 15.50 2.14 2.494 7.82 Not Rejected 24
1984 979.01 2918.78 39.25 2.99 3.325 12.93 Not Rejected 34
1985 218.24 876.77 17.55 4.02 5.652 33.87 Not Rejected 38
1986 133.65 243.58 10.50 1.82 1.994 5.98 Not Rejected 27
1987 184.30 1067.32 7.15 5.78 6.911 49.16 Rejected 52
1988 95.35 343.23 7.20 3.60 6.221 44.65 Not Rejected 66
1989 40.76 106.51 8.05 2.61 5.511 38.79 Not Rejected 104
1990 30.31 80.30 5.60 2.65 4.765 29.41 Not Rejected 160
1991 29.43 85.53 5.10 2.91 4.689 25.30 Not Rejected 100
1992 40.12 135.32 5.20 3.38 6.881 55.57 Not Rejected 91
1993 40.22 114.38 7.80 2.81 6.716 56.34 Not Rejected 127
1994 40.73 94.50 11.40 2.29 4.013 20.09 Not Rejected 93
25Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table A-5: Summary Statistics for Size of Transaction in Thermal Equivalence, 2 6 All Transactions
26Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs)
27Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 27  # Obs.
TBTUs TBTUs TBTUs Variation
All Years 119.70 853.78 11.00 7.09 16.16 301.42 Rejected 959
1979 521.45 1014.34 23.20 2.12 1.66 3.93 Not Rejected 6
1980 128.74 282.73 29.20 2.36 2.71 8.97 Rejected 13
1981 67.32 101.91 15.00 1.64 1.31 2.78 Not Rejected 9
1982 486.24 1593.60 28.60 3.19 3.45 12.96 Not Rejected 15
1983 128.90 305.88 14.49 2.14 2.82 10.21 Rejected 24
1984 1238.02 3981.38 30.07 2.99 3.51 14.11 Not Rejected 34
1985 262.84 1018.79 18.70 4.02 5.52 32.77 Rejected 38
1986 155.47 297.62 12.00 1.82 2.27 7.36 Not Rejected 27
1987 141.58 723.40 10.07 5.78 6.80 48.05 Rejected 52
1988 91.63 295.36 10.78 3.60 5.67 38.30 Not Rejected 66
1989 42.41 79.59 13.40 2.61 4.16 25.07 Rejected 104
1990 41.96 125.16 8.32 2.65 5.52 36.61 Not Rejected 160
1991 33.35 92.54 6.00 2.91 5.04 30.39 Rejected 100
1992 49.49 150.26 8.99 3.38 6.19 45.57 Rejected 91
1993 46.88 90.83 13.70 2.84 3.38 14.76 Not Rejected 127
1994 47.26 96.01 15.00 2.29 4.41 26.97 Rejected 93
Table A-6: Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
28Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 28 # Obs.
$mm $mm $mm Variation
All Years 26.85 61.14 7.00 2.29 5.48 42.17 Not Rejected 879
1979 17.00 8.02 13.25 0.47 1.14 2.32 Rejected 4
1980 34.30 28.09 26.05 0.82 1.15 3.28 Not Rejected 10
1981 33.10 21.83 29.00 0.66 1.17 3.45 Not Rejected 7
1982 61.21 63.22 32.00 1.03 0.76 1.90 Not Rejected 13
1983 26.26 41.72 13.80 1.59 2.65 9.24 Not Rejected 21
1984 84.21 128.89 25.10 1.53 2.03 6.20 Not Rejected 30
1985 15.48 15.41 9.40 1.00 1.50 4.57 Not Rejected 23
1986 65.79 131.51 9.80 2.00 2.21 6.52 Not Rejected 23
1987 24.68 49.65 6.50 2.01 3.23 13.84 Not Rejected 50
1988 31.55 88.12 6.15 2.79 5.96 41.70 Not Rejected 60
1989 24.07 41.66 7.60 1.73 3.12 13.82 Not Rejected 98
1990 23.64 67.88 5.00 2.87 6.43 52.49 Not Rejected 153
1991 15.81 32.63 5.00 2.06 4.53 28.66 Not Rejected 96
1992 19.79 48.04 4.50 2.43 6.06 46.37 Not Rejected 85
1993 27.37 51.89 7.05 1.90 3.89 21.25 Not Rejected 122
1994 18.70 28.61 8.20 2.25 2.95 12.18 Rejected 84
Table A-7: Summary Statistics for Size of Transaction in Thermal Equivalence, 29 Excluding Outliers
29Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs).
30Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 30 # Obs.
rBTUs TBTUs TBTUs Variation
All Years 32.01 70.03 9.80 2.21 5.77 47.79 Not Rejected 879
1979 18.30 6.41 19.70 0.35 -0.53 1.73 Not Rejected 4
1980 27.32 17.04 25.30 0.62 0.54 2.25 Not Rejected 10
1981 16.27 11.79 15.00 0.72 1.07 2.95 Not Rejected 7
1982 56.76 87.65 27.60 1.54 2.28 7.35 Not Rejected 13
1983 24.39 44.20 10.30 1.81 3.29 13.39 Not Rejected 21
1984 70.75 112.15 26.45 1.59 2.09 6.10 Not Rejected 30
1985 20.71 36.82 11.30 1.78 3.75 16.70 Not Rejected 23
1986 57.02 139.31 9.56 2.08 2.32 6.97 Not Rejected 23
1987 31.11 66.25 9.36 2.13 4.41 25.16 Not Rejected 50
1988 38.21 98.38 9.21 2.58 5.53 37.25 Not Rejected 60
1989 30.05 42.36 12.25 1.41 2.27 8.25 Not Rejected 98
1990 29.53 85.34 7.76 2.89 6.99 60.45 Not Rejected 153
1991 19.08 35.23 5.97 1.85 3.91 22.18 Not Rejected 96
1992 29.69 74.13 7.10 2.50 6.52 51.80 Not Rejected 85
1993 36.62 63.23 12.65 1.73 3.40 16.66 Not Rejected 122
1994 25.65 35.50 13.33 1.75 2.75 11.73 Not Rejected 84
Table A-8: Summary Statistics for Pure Oil Transaction Values. Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
1 2
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 3 1 # Obs.
$mm $mm $mm Variation
1979 ... .................. 0
1980 26.90 6.60 27.10 0.25 -0.06 1.50 ... 3
1981 0.00 0 20.00 .. ... ... 2
1982 159.30 0 159.30 ... . ... 1
1983 14.05 17.61 14.05 1.25 0.000 ... ... 2
1984 20.76 17.52 14.90 0.84 0.96 2.82 Not Rejected 7
1985 13.80 14.16 7.30 1.03 0.38 1.30 Not Rejected 5
1986 32.93 43.94 15.00 1.34 0.63 1.50 ... 3
1987 27.96 79.00 1.70 2.83 2.82 8.99 Rejected 11
1988 62.54 187.00 2.65 2.99 2.98 9.94 Not Rejected 12
1989 21.33 47.47 3.50 2.23 3.15 12.06 Not Rejected 18
1990 27.70 108.77 1.55 3.92 5.26 29.96 Rejected 36
1991 14.58 24.07 2.90 1.65 1.70 4.19 Not Rejected 19
1992 13.07 29.12 2.70 2.23 2.84 9.91 Not Rejected 17
1993 13.45 14.87 7.40 1.11 1.60 5.09 Not Rejected 28
1994 18.66 29.15 6.40 1.24 2.39 7.72 Rejected 13
... Insufficient data points
3 1Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table A-9: Summary Statistics for Size of Pure Oil Transactions in Thermal Equivalence. 3 2
Excluding Outliers
1 2
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 3 3 # Obs.
TBTUs TBTUs TBTUs Variation
1979 ... ... ...... ..... . .. 0
1980 15.10 25.00 27.0 1.66 -0.24 1.50 Not Rejected 3
1981 15.00 0 15.0 ... ... ... 2
1982 134.40 0 134.4 ... ... ... 1
1983 8.28 9.42 8.3 1.14 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1984 18.15 14.88 11.6 0.82 0.84 2.42 Not Rejected 7
1985 50.42 75.40 8.3 1.50 1.25 2.84 Not Rejected 5
1986 22.30 28.00 12.0 1.26 0.58 1.50 Not Rejected 3
1987 44.65 124.72 6.0 2.79 2.83 9.03 Rejected 11
1988 68.16 202.13 3.2 2.97 2.98 9.97 Not Rejected 12
1989 27.13 51.28 6.6 1.89 2.35 7.14 Not Rejected 18
1990 37.35 142.90 2.1 3.83 5.19 29.34 Rejected 36
1991 18.77 30.93 4.8 1.65 1.79 4.68 Not Rejected 19
1992 22.69 37.85 6.0 1.67 2.06 5.96 Not Rejected 17
1993 23.36 25.04 19.2 1.07 1.73 5.82 Not Rejected 28
1994 24.67 27.25 13.2 1.23 1.55 4.69 Not Rejected 13
... insufficient data points
32Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs).
33Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table A-10: Summary Statistics for Pure Gas Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
1 2
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 34  # Obs.
$mm $mm $mm Variation
1979 .. .. ... ...... .. 0
1980 21.15 26.66 21.15 1.26 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1981 ... ... ... .... 0
1982 ... .... 0
1983 7.50 0 7.50 ........ 1
1984 294.00 0 294.00 ... ... ... 1
1985 6.90 9.19 6.90 1.33 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1986 3.90 0.57 3.90 0.15 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1987 9.16 7.90 7.30 0.86 1.10 2.77 Not Rejected 5
1988 4.09 4.09 2.55 1.00 0.92 2.62 Not Rejected 8
1989 25.02 40.78 5.75 1.63 2.27 6.74 Not Rejected 18
1990 30.85 76.93 5.70 2.49 4.04 19.50 Not Rejected 29
1991 25.14 37.87 9.00 1.51 1.65 4.23 Not Rejected 19
1992 11.73 17.29 3.40 1.48 1.75 4.84 Not Rejected 20
1993 28.94 41.58 6.50 1.44 1.90 6.21 Not Rejected 29
1994 20.99 34.52 8.40 1.97 2.77 10.68 Not Rejected 30
34Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table A-11: Summary Statistics for Size of Pure Gas Transactions in Thermal Equivalence, 35
Excluding Outliers
1 2
35Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs).36Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 36 # Obs.
TBTUs TBTUs TBTUs Variation
1979 .. ... . . .. .... O
1980 27.00 22.06 27.00 0.82 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1981 ... ...... ... . ... ... 0
1982 ... ... ... ... . ... O
1983 7.15 0 7.15 ... ...... 1
1984 222.00 0 222.00 ... ... ... 1
1985 8.45 11.63 8.45 1.38 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1986 6.30 0.99 6.30 0.16 0.00 1.00 ... 2
1987 10.31 8.30 7.03 0.81 1.01 2.52 Not Rejected 5
1988 6.39 5.46 4.72 0.86 0.83 2.63 Not Rejected 8
1989 21.21 29.18 14.35 1.38 2.16 6.24 Not Rejected 18
1990 38.01 94.49 9.80 2.49 4.27 21.20 Not Rejected 29
1991 27.79 41.29 11.00 1.49 1.85 4.92 Not Rejected 19
1992 17.77 21.52 8.00 1.21 1.26 2.99 Not Rejected 20
1993 40.83 58.62 12.10 1.44 1.94 6.07 Not Rejected 29
1994 27.61 42.45 11.50 1.81 2.76 11.17 Not Rejected 30
Table A-12: Regional 3 7 Summary Statistics for Transaction Values, Excluding Outliers
[Millions of Nominal $, where relevant]
37For the purposes of this table:
"Texas, Louisiana, Gulf'" = East Texas, Gulf Coast Texas/South Texas, South Louisiana, Offshore Texas,
Panhandle Texas, Other Texas and West Texas, (on Scotia Map: regions E, G, L, O, P, T, and W,
respectively)
"Rockies, New Mex." = Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Utah and Wyoming (on Scotia Map: regions R and N)
"Central States" = Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska and Oklahoma (on Scotia Map: region M)
38Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year/Region Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 38 # Obs.
$mm $mm $mm Variation
1989/Texas, Louis., Gulf 16.00 30.50 5.60 1.90 3.82 17.24 Not Rejected 23
1990/Texas, Louis., Gulf 12.44 28.80 4.05 2.32 3.94 18.57 Not Rejected 54
1991/Texas, Louis., Gulf 10.88 19.41 2.85 1.78 2.55 8.60 Not Rejected 36
1992/Texas, Louis., Gulf 12.02 19.87 3.70 1.65 2.21 6.97 Not Rejected 33
1993/Texas, Louis., Gulf 42.06 75.39 8.30 1.79 2.96 12.36 Not Rejected 26
1994/Texas, Louis., Gulf 17.36 30.29 6.50 1.75 3.52 16.31 Rejected 34
1990/Rockies, New Mex. 2.78 4.07 0.90 1.46 1.82 5.19 Not Rejected 12
1993/Rockies, New Mex. 9.03 10.97 6.00 1.22 2.29 8.70 Rejected 23
1990/Central 11.74 22.75 4.00 1.94 3.32 13.33 Rejected 19
1993/Central 8.69 15.83 1.90 1.82 2.51 8.37 Not Rejected 14
Excluding Outliers
39Trillion BTUs: 1 Trillion BTUs = 1 Billion Cubic Feet at 1,000 BTUs per cubic foot (TBTUs).
4 0Conventional normality was rejected for all years. The normality test used is Shapiro-Wilk. "Reject"
indicates that normality was rejected at 95% confidence level.
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year/Region Mean Std. Dev. Median Coeff. of Skewness Kurtosis Log Normality 40  # Obs.
TBTUs TBTUs TBTUs Variation
1989/Texas, Louis., Gulf 18.84 22.90 10.56 1.22 2.13 7.28 Rejected 23
1990/Texas, Louis., Gulf 14.64 33.20 5.68 2.27 5.02 31.08 Not Rejected 54
1991/Texas, Louis., Gulf 13.02 21.27 4.59 1.63 2.56 9.12 Rejected 36
1992/Texas, Louis., Gulf 14.82 22.35 5.10 1.51 2.23 7.56 Not Rejected 33
1993/Texas, Louis., Gulf 45.85 79.12 15.96 1.73 3.12 13.55 Nor Rejected 26
1994/Texas, Louis., Gulf 31.53 63.64 9.15 2.02 3.42 15.72 Rejected 34
1990/Rockies, New Mex. 5.70 8.28 1.65 1.45 1.45 3.58 Not Rejected 12
1993/Rockies, New Mex. 15.87 17.14 11.00 1.08 1.96 7.16 Rejected 23
1990/Central 14.58 27.25 6.48 1.87 3.21 12.61 Not Rejected 19
1993/Central 16.15 33.57 3.77 2.08 3.06 10.90 Not Rejected 14
Summary Statistics for S 
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Table A-13: 
Regional
Table A-14: Number of Transactions by Type of Buyer
Year Foreign Fund Independent Individual Major Sub/Service Unknown Total
Co
All 51 241 458 3 27 49 130 959
1979 0 3 1 0 1 0 1 6
1980 0 3 7 0 3 0 0 13
1981 1 4 2 0 0 0 2 9
1982 1 5 4 0 0 1 4 15
1983 0 7 8 0 2 2 5 24
1984 5 6 13 1 4 2 3 34
1985 1 16 14 0 0 2 5 38
1986 2 8 13 0 0 2 2 27
1987 5 21 21 0 2 2 1 52
1988 4 23 33 1 2 2 1 66
1989 8 31 50 1 3 5 6 104
1990 6 40 86 0 4 5 19 160
1991 2 22 54 0 1 9 12 100
1992 2 15 45 0 1 7 21 91
1993 11 21 61 0 1 6 27 127
1994 3 16 46 0 3 4 21 93
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table A-15: Number of Transactions by Type of Deal
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Merger Property Stock Unknown Total
All 155 784 6 14 959
1979 1 4 0 1 6
1980 5 6 0 2 13
1981 2 6 0 1 9
1982 5 9 0 1 15
1983 7 16 0 1 24
1984 10 21 0 3 34
1985 12 25 0 1 38
1986 9 18 0 0 27
1987 11 41 0 0 52
1988 10 55 0 1 66
1989 17 83 2 2 104
1990 17 143 0 0 160
1991 11 88 0 1 100
1992 13 78 0 0 91
1993 17 108 2 0 127
1994 8 83 2 0 93
Table A-16: Number of Transactions by Type of Payment
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Cash Combined Property Stock Unknown Total
Swap
All 549 74 2 45 289 959
1979 1 0 0 0 5 6
1980 9 1 0 1 2 13
1981 6 1 0 1 1 9
1982 9 2 0 2 2 15
1983 15 2 0 4 3 24
1984 25 2 0 0 7 34
1985 30 4 0 2 2 38
1986 18 3 0 3 3 27
1987 41 5 0 3 3 52
1988 53 7 0 2 4 66
1989 77 5 1 5 16 104
1990 84 7 1 4 64 160
1991 55 7 0 4 34 100
1992 44 8 0 3 36 91
1993 58 9 0 9 51 127
1994 24 11 0 2 56 93
Appendix B: Estimates of Reserve Prices
Table B-la: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included)
Year # Obs Constant t stat Oil Coeff t stat Gas Coeff t stat Adjusted2
$/bbl $/mcf
1979 6 9.45 1.26 11.41 77.43 -1.44 -9.85 1.00
1980 13 -15.15 -1.24 14.17 23.68 2.04 10.22 1.00
1981 9 -5.04 -0.47 5.57 8.35 3.69 17.10 0.98
1982 15 15.91 0.92 5.92 9.38 0.88 4.31 1.00
1983 24 13.50 0.91 4.16 6.53 0.65 6.38 0.90
1984 34 53.80 1.76 3.70 32.83 1.01 23.55 1.00
1985 38 -19.56 -1.01 2.53 4.59 1.68 9.53 0.98
1986 27 12.79 1.31 1.96 3.01 0.96 20.48 0.97
1987 52 -30.96 -3.48 8.36 34.33 2.09 6.98 1.00
1988 66 -9.20 4.49 6.17 22.66 1.21 52.64 0.99
1989 104 -9.22 -2.14 4.76 5.41 1.35 23.37 0.87
1990 160 6.83 2.42 4.10 20.94 0.46 13.68 0.82
1991 100 -1.43 -0.82 3.37 11.13 1.16 28.30 0.96
1992 91 -4.33 -1.87 6.41 28.22 0.76 26.07 0.98
1993 127 -6.07 -1.00 1.46 1.16 1.33 14.46 0.72
1994 93 0.79 0.15 5.73 13.05 0.741 7.64 0.78
Note: Transaction values are regressed on reserves of oil (in bbls) and on natural gas (in mcf).
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table B-lb: Regression Results for All Transactions (No Constant)
1 2 6 7
Year # Obs Oil Coeff t stat Gas Coeff t stat Adjusted
$/bbl $/mcf R2
1979 6 11.34 76.77 -1.35 -9.91 1.00
1980 13 14.27 23.46 1.95 10.29 1.00
1981 9 5.45 9.42 3.66 19.20 0.99
1982 15 5.74 9.62 0.94 4.98 1.00
1983 24 4.31 7.03 0.66 6.51 0.92
1984 34 3.71 31.85 1.02 23.36 1.00
1985 38 2.59 4.72 1.65 9.51 0.98
1986 27 2.12 3.26 0.97 21.16 0.97
1987 52 8.61 33.56 1.70 5.54 1.00
1988 66 6.07 22.13 1.20 51.48 0.99
1989 104 4.14 4.90 1.32 23.23 0.88
1990 160 4.18 21.33 0.48 14.49 0.84
1991 100 3.35 11.12 1.16 28.82 0.97
1992 91 6.34 27.92 0.75 25.67 0.98
1993 127 1.15 0.95 1.31 14.56 0.75
1994 93 5.74 13.35 0.75 8.26 0.82
Note: Transaction values are regressed on reserves of oil (in bbls) and on natural gas (in mcf).
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table B-1c: Comparisons of Oil Regression Values with Pure Oil Values
Year Oil Coefficient # Obs Weighted ppb from pure # Obs Ratio of Estimated Oil
(constant included in oil cases Coefficient to pure
regression) $/bbl transaction ppb
$/bbl
1979 11.41 6 0
1980 14.17 13 6.46 3 2.19
1981 5.57 9 5.62 3 0.99
1982 5.92 15 7.11 1 0.83
1983 4.16 24 10.18 2 0.41
1984 3.70 34 6.93 8 0.54
1985 2.53 38 0.41 7 6.17
1986 1.96 27 8.86 3 0.22
1987 8.36 52 5.26 12 1.59
1988 6.17 66 6.44 14 0.96
1989 4.76 104 4.72 19 1.00
1990 4.10 160 4.50 38 0.91
1991 3.37 100 4.69 20 0.72
1992 6.41 91 4.75 19 1.35
1993 1.46 127 3.64 29 0.40
1994 5.73 93 7.41 16 0.77
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table B-ld: Comparisons of Gas Regression Values with Pure Gas Values
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Gas Coefficient # Obs Weighted ppmcf from # Obs Ratio of estimated gas
(constant included in pure gas transactions coefficient to pure
regression) transaction ppmcf$/mcf
$/mcf
1979 -1.44 6 0 0
1980 2.04 13 0.78 2 2.61
1981 3.69 9 0 0
1982 0.88 15 0 0
1983 0.65 24 1.05 1 0.62
1984 1.01 34 1.32 1 0.77
1985 1.68 35 1.86 6 0.90
1986 0.96 27 0.92 3 1.04
1987 2.09 52 0.89 5 2.35
1988 1.21 66 1.00 9 1.21
1989 1.35 104 1.18 18 1.14
1990 0.46 160 0.83 30 0.55
1991 1.16 100 0.90 19 1.29
1992 0.76 91 0.66 20 1.15
1993 1.33 127 0.68 30 2.05
1994 0.88 93 0.84 32 1.05
Table B-2a: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included), Excluding Outliers
1 2
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year # Obs Constant t stat Oil Coeff t stat Gas Coeff t stat Adjusted
$/bbl $/mcf R2
1979 4 16.69 7.18 3.64 6.22 -0.70 -3.92 0.98
1980 10 -0.95 -0.10 6.30 2.48 1.480 5.52 0.76
1981 7 12.25 1.09 5.22 0.87 1.640 2.96 0.543
1982 13 26.09 1.85 5.71 3.20 0.280 1.32 0.57
1983 21 2.64 1.51 2.75 5.88 1.390 16.66 0.97
1984 30 4.69 0.87 7.53 13.37 1.050 16.48 0.96
1985 23 2.62 1.13 1.15 4.15 1.570 7.54 0.73
1986 23 2.73 1.08 5.68 12.81 0.940 17.44 0.99
1987 50 -2.04 -1.05 3.84 23.24 1.100 16.18 0.95
1988 60 -2.10 -1.37 5.52 69.77 0.720 19.53 0.99
1989 98 -3.02 -1.42 5.05 12.23 0.940 16.40 0.83
1990 153 -0.19 -0.25 4.58 74.10 0.84 0 56.24 0.98
1991 96 -1.55 -2.17 5.18 25.87 0.940 36.17 0.96
1992 85 1.12 1.08 3.61 15.66 0.65 0 44.49 0.97
1993 122 -0.85 -0.56 4.00 10.35 0.820 32.11 0.93
1994 84 -1.23 -1.113 4.84 16.52 0.761 25.70 0.92
Table B-2b: Regression Results for All Transactions (Constant Included), Excluding Outliers
[With Heteroscedastic Consistent Standard Errors, rather than OLS Standard Errors]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year # Obs Constant t stat Oil Coeff t stat Gas Coeff t stat Adjusted
$/bbl $/mcf R2
1979 4 16.69 18.49 3.64 16.99 -0.70 -8.44 0.98
1980 10 -0.95 -0.15 6.30 4.14 1.48 6.51 0.76
1981 7 12.25 1.28 5.22 1.33 1.64 4.07 0.54
1982 13 26.09 2.27 5.71 5.21 0.28 1.51 0.57
1983 21 2.64 1.63 2.75 8.80 1.39 24.53 0.97
1984 30 4.69 1.39 7.53 10.96 1.05 7.21 0.96
1985 23 2.62 1.69 1.15 5.63 1.57 6.74 0.73
1986 23 2.73 1.42 5.68 8.89 0.94 10.99 0.99
1987 50 -2.04 -1.90 3.84 125.29 1.10 7.32 0.95
1988 60 -2.10 -0.27 5.52 181.40 0.72 7.57 0.99
1989 98 -3.02 -1.81 5.05 5.28 0.94 6.97 0.83
1990 153 -0.19 -0.33 4.58 173.43 0.84 24.93 0.98
1991 96 -1.55 -2.10 5.18 10.09 0.94 20.23 0.96
1992 85 1.12 1.38 3.61 6.18 0.65 40.00 0.97
1993 122 -0.85 -0.81 4.00 7.16 0.82 9.88 0.93
1994 84 -1.23 -1.69 4.84 7.66 0.76 19.06 0.92
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table B-2c: Regression Results for All Transactions (No Constant). Excluding Outliers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Year # Obs Oil Coeff t stat Gas Coeff t stat Adjusted
$/bbl $/mcf R2
1979 4 7.25 4.76 .49 1.41 0.91
1980 10 6.09 4.31 1.46 8.86 0.91
1981 7 10.18 2.51 1.97 4.131 0.85
1982 13 7.13 4.02 .36 1.54 0.72
1983 21 2.82 5.86 1.43 17.59 0.98
1984 30 7.63 13.93 1.08 18.18 0.97
1985 23 1.27 5.06 1.72 10.76 0.86
1986 23 5.70 12.85 .95 17.83 0.99
1987 50 3.81 23.46 1.07 18.02 0.96
1988 60 5.52 71.74 0.71 21.85 0.99
1989 98 4.88 12.31 0.90 17.61 0.87
1990 153 4.57 75.33 .084 59.67 0.98
1991 96 5.07 25.65 0.92 36.93 0.97
1992 85 3.70 17.14 0.65 45.50 0.97
1993 122 3.92 10.92 0.82 33.19 0.94
1994 84 4.71 17.47 0.75 28.04 0.94
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table B-2d: Effect of Including Constant on Regression Coefficients
[Exclusive of Outliers]
1 2
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Oil Coefficient ($/bbl) Gas Coefficient ($/mcf) # Obs
Constant No Constant Ratio Constant No Constant Ratio
Included Included
1979 3.64 7.25 0.50 -0.70 0.49 -1.43 4
1980 6.30 6.09 1.03 1.48 1.46 1.01 10
1981 5.22 10.18 0.51 1.64 1.97 0.83 7
1982 5.71 7.13 0.80 0.28 0.36 0.78 13
1983 2.75 2.82 0.98 1.39 1.43 0.97 21
1984 7.53 7.63 0.99 1.05 1.08 0.97 30
1985 1.14 1.27 0.90 1.57 1.72 0.91 23
1986 5.68 5.70 1.00 0.94 0.95 0.99 23
1987 3.84 3.81 1.01 1.10 1.07 1.03 50
1988 5.52 5.52 1.00 0.72 0.71 1.01 60
1989 5.05 4.88 1.03 0.94 0.90 1.04 98
1990 4.58 4.57 1.00 0.84 0.84 1.00 153
1991 5.18 5.07 1.02 0.94 0.92 1.02 96
1992 3.61 3.70 0.98 0.65 0.65 1.00 85
1993 4.00 3.92 1.02 0.82 0.82 1.00 122
1994 4.84 4.71 1.02 0.76 0.75 1.01 84
Table B-2e: Effect of Outliers on Reserve Coefficients
[Constant Included]
Year Oil Coefficients ($/bbl) Gas Coefficients ($/mcf)
All Data Excluding Ratio All Data Excluding Ratio
Outliers Outliers
1979 11.41 3.64 3.13 -1.44 -0.70 2.06
1980 14.17 6.30 2.25 2.04 1.48 1.38
1981 5.57 5.22 1.07 3.69 1.64 2.25
1982 5.92 5.71 1.04 0.88 0.28 3.14
1983 4.16 2.75 1.51 0.65 1.39 0.47
1984 3.70 7.53 0.49 1.01 1.05 0.96
1985 2.53 1.15 2.20 1.68 1.57 1.07
1986 1.96 5.68 0.35 0.96 0.94 1.02
1987 8.36 3.84 2.18 2.09 1.10 1.90
1988 6.17 5.52 1.12 1.21 0.72 1.68
1989 4.76 5.05 0.94 1.35 0.94 1.44
1990 4.10 4.58 0.90 0.46 0.84 0.55
1991 3.37 5.18 0.65 1.16 0.94 1.23
1992 6.41 3.61 1.78 0.76 0.65 1.17
1993 1.46 4.00 0.37 1.33 0.82 1.62
1994 5.73 4.84 1.18 0.74 0.76 0.97
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Table B-2f: Comparisons of Oil Regression Values with Pure Oil Values, Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Oil Coefficient # Obs Weighted ppb from # Obs Ratio of Estimated Oil(constant included in pure oil cases Coefficient to pure
regression) $/bbl transaction ppb$/bbl
1979 3.64 4 0
1980 6.30 10 6.46 3 0.98
1981 5.22 7 8.00 2 0.65
1982 5.71 13 7.11 1 0.80
1983 2.75 21 10.18 2 0.27
1984 7.53 30 6.86 7 1.10
1985 1.14 23 1.64 5 0.70
1986 5.68 23 8.86 3 0.64
1987 3.84 50 3.75 11 1.02
1988 5.52 60 5.51 12 1.00
1989 5.05 98 4.71 18 1.07
1990 4.58 153 4.45 36 1.03
1991 5.18 96 4.66 19 1.11
1992 3.61 85 3.46 17 1.04
1993 4.00 122 3.46 28 1.16
1994 4.84 84 4.54 13 1.07
Table B-2g: Comparisons of Gas Regression Values with Pure Gas Values, Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Gas Coefficient # Obs Weighted ppmcf from # Obs Ratio of estimated gas
(constant included in pure gas transactions coefficient to pure transaction
regression) ($/mcf) ($/mcf) ppmcf
1979 -0.70 4 0
1980 1.48 10 0.78 2 1.89
1981 1.64 7 0
1982 0.28 13 0
1983 1.39 21 1.04 1 1.33
1984 1.05 30 1.32 1 0.80
1985 1.57 23 0.82 2 1.91
1986 0.94 23 0.62 2 1.51
1987 1.10 50 0.89 5 1.24
1988 0.72 60 0.64 8 1.12
1989 0.94 98 1.18 18 0.79
1990 0.84 153 0.81 29 1.03
1991 0.94 96 0.90 19 1.04
1992 0.65 85 0.66 20 0.98
1993 0.82 122 0.71 29 1.15
1994 0.76 84 0.76 30 1.00
Table B-3a: Pure Oil Transactions: Producing and Partly-Producing Properties. Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year All Pure # Producing # Partly- # Ratio of all Ratio of
Transactions Obs Obs Producing Obs to partly-
($/bbl) producing producing to($/bbl) ($/bbl) producing
1979 0 0 0
1980 6.46 3 6.70 2 6.02 1 0.96 0.90
1981 8.00 2 8.00 2 0
1982 7.11 1 7.11 1 0
1983 10.18 2 10.18 2 0
1984 6.86 7 6.89 4 6.75 3 1.00 0.98
1985 1.64 5 1.61 4 6 1 1.02 3.73
1986 8.86 3 8.86 3 0
1987 3.76 11 3.69 9 4.79 2 1.02 1.30
1988 5.51 12 3.87 9 5.59 3 1.42 1.44
1989 4.72 18 5.47 12 3.12 6 0.86 0.57
1990 4.45 36 4.48 28 4.00 10 0.99 0.89
1991 4.66 19 4.63 9 4.67 10 1.00 1.00
1992 3.46 17 2.38 11 3.74 6 1.45 1.57
1993 3.46 28 3.36 16 3.56 12 1.03 1.06
1994 4.54 13 3.26 5 4.78 8 1.39 1.47
Table B-3b: Oil Regression Results: Producing and Partly-Producing Properties (Constant Included).
Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year All Transactions # Producing # Partly- # Ratio of all Ratio of
Obs Obs Producing Obs to partly-
($/bbl) ($/bbl) producing producing
($/bbl) to
producing
1979 3.64 4 0 3.64 4
1980 6.30 10 2.89 6 6.67 4 2.18 2.31
1981 5.21 17 10.90 4 25.84 13 0.48 2.37
1982 5.71 13 7.64 8 7.69 5 0.75 1.01
1983 2.75 21 7.32 13 2.53 8 2.53 0.35
1984 7.53 30 8.04 15 7.57 15 0.94 0.94
1985 1.15 23 1.10 17 3.05 6 1.05 2.78
1986 5.68 23 6.69 14 5.89 9 0.85 0.88
1987 3.84 50 3.83 36 4.13 14 1.00 1.08
1988 5.52 60 4.59 44 5.52 16 1.20 1.20
1989 5.05 98 5.97 55 3.36 43 0.85 0.56
1990 4.58 153 4.56 108 7.16 45 1.00 1.57
1991 5.18 96 4.21 60 5.23 36 1.23 1.24
1992 3.61 85 2.62 44 3.62 41 1.37 1.38
1993 4.00 122 4.48 70 3.32 52 0.89 0.74
1994 4.84 84 4.72 38 5.42 46 1.17 1.15
Table B-3c: Pure Gas Transactions: Producing and Partly-Producing Properties4 1 Properties. Excluding
Outliers
[Weighted per MCF for pure gas transactions]
41The Scotia Group database distinguishes where information is available between reserve assets on
production ("producing") and those where some of the reserves are not on production ("partly
producing").
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year All Pure # Obs Producing # Obs Partly- # Obs Ratio of all to Ratio of partly-
Transactions ($/mcf) Producing producing producing to
($/mcf) ($/mcf) _producing
1979 0 0 0
1980 7.83 2 0 0.78 2
1981 0 0 0
1982 0 0 0
1983 1.05 1 1.05 1 0 1.00
1984 1.32 1 0 1.32 1
1985 .82 2 0.82 2 0 1.00
1986 .62 2 0.62 2 0 1.00
1987 .89 5 0.71 3 1.02 2 1.25 1.45
1988 .64 8 0.60 7 0.82 1 1.07 1.37
1989 1.18 18 0.97 8 1.42 10 1.22 1.47
1990 .81 29 0.89 18 0.78 11 0.91 0.87
1991 .91 19 0.86 12 0.94 7 1.06 1.10
1992 .66 20 0.60 9 0.78 11 1.11 1.31
1993 .71 29 0.61 18 0.83 11 1.15 1.35
1994 .76 30 0.65 13 0.79 17 1.17 1.22
Table B-3d: Gas Regression Results: Producing and Partly-Producing Properties (Constant Included),
Excluding Outliers
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year All # Obs Producing # Obs Partly- # Obs Ratio of all to Ratio of partly-
Transactions Producing producing producing to
(/mf)(mc producing($/mcf) ($/mcf)
1979 -0.70 4 0 -0.70 4
1980 1.48 10 1.50 6 0.97 4 0.99 0.65
1981 1.64 17 2.31 4 0.56 3 0.71 0.24
1982 0.28 13 2.55 8 0.03 5 0.11 0.01
1983 1.39 21 1.38 13 1.41 8 1.01 1.02
1984 1.05 30 1.58 15 1.02 15 0.67 0.65
1985 1.57 23 1.57 17 0.62 6 1.00 0.39
1986 0.94 23 0.87 14 0.88 9 1.08 1.01
1987 1.10 50 1.20 36 0.83 14 0.92 0.70
1988 0.72 60 0.81 44 0.57 16 0.89 0.71
1989 0.94 98 0.71 55 1.13 43 1.32 1.60
1990 0.84 153 0.91 108 0.81 45 0.92 0.89
1991 0.94 96 0.90 60 0.97 36 1.05 1.08
1992 0.64 85 0.72 44 0.64 41 0.89 0.88
1993 0.82 122 0.69 70 0.91 52 1.19 1.33
1994 0.76 84 0.56 38 0.80 46 1.36 1.43
Table B-4a: Regression Coefficients by Region (Constant Included). Excluding Outliers
[Including OLS Standard Errors in parentheses]
Note: Includes only those Regions/Years with 12 or more observations. Standard errors of
included in parentheses to facilitate tests of differences between coefficients.
coefficients have been
Source: The Scotia Group M&A Database, v8.0, January 1995
Year Oil Coefficients ($/bbl) GII as Coefficients ($/mcf)
All Trans. Tex, Louis, Central Rockies, All Trans. Tex, Central Rockies,
Offshore New Mex. Louis, New Mex.
Offshore
1988 5.52(.08) 0.72(.036)
1989 5.05(.41) 2.00(2.36) 0.94(.057) 1.22(.16)
1990 4.58(.06) 4.42(.22) 5.2(1.4) 4.23(.38) 0.84(.014) 1.39(.11) 0.83(.022) 0.32(.04)
1991 5.18(.20) 4.76(.36) 0.94(.026) 0.95(.05)
1992 3.61(.23) 2.94(.79) 0.64(.014) 0.89(.04)
1993 4.00(.39) 3.98(.80) 5.68(.58) 3.04(.42) 0.82(.025) 0.99(.04) 0.46(.016) 0.63(.04)
1994 4.84(.29) 4.72(.56) 0.76 (.03) 0.78(.02)
Appendix C: Auxiliary Data and Regressions
Table C-la: Oil Prices Reeionallv and Natinnallv
[Nominal Dollars per Barrel]
Year All Regions Texas, Louis., Central States Rockies, New Mex.
Gulf
1981 31.77 35.19 35.40 34.01
1982 28.52 31.99 31.52 20.76
1983 26.19 29.58 29.20 28.35
1984 25.88 29.16 28.70 24.70
1985 24.09 26.95 25.95 25.29
1986 12.51 14.95 14.32 13.65
1987 15.40 17.60 17.51 16.95
1988 12.58 14.78 14.72 14.06
1989 15.86 17.89 18.13 17.47
1990 20.03 22.47 22.92 21.90
1991 16.54 19.28 19.56 18.61
1992 15.99 18.42 18.67 17.75
1993 14.25 16.42 16.04 15.82
1994 13.19 15.19 15.40 14.64
Note: Regional prices have been calculated as a production weighted average of State prices.
These are prices at the field gate.
Source: EIA/DOE "Petroleum Supply Annual" Report
Table C-1a: Oil Prices Rep-ionallv and Na onallv
Table C-1b: Oil Prices Relative to Central States
Year Texas, Louis., Central States Rockies, New Mex.
Gulf
1981 0.99 1.00 0.96
1982 1.08 1.00 0.98
1983 1.01 1.00 0.97
1984 1.02 1.00 0.86
1985 1.04 1.00 0.97
1986 1.04 1.00 0.95
1987 0.99 1.00 0.97
1988 1.00 1.00 0.96
1989 0.99 1.00 0.96
1990 0.98 1.00 0.96
1991 0.99 1.00 0.95
1992 0.99 1.00 0.95
Note: Regional prices have been calculated as a production weighted average of State prices.
Source: EIA/DOE "Petroleum Supply Annual" Report
Table C-1c: Natural Gas Prices Regionally and Nationally
[Nominal Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet]
Year All Regions Texas, Louis., Central States Rockies, New Mex.
Gulf
1978 0.91 0.85 0.79 0.91
1979 1.18 1.17 1.00 1.30
1980 1.59 1.58 1.28 1.72
1981 1.98 1.97 1.65 2.19
1982 2.46 2.38 2.50 2.74
1983 2.59 2.51 2.56 2.88
1984 2.66 2.59 2.49 2.98
1985 2.51 2.48 2.24 2.75
1986 1.94 1.90 1.66 2.11
1987 1.67 1.61 1.46 1.70
1988 1.69 1.65 1.53 1.69
1989 1.69 1.66 1.61 1.45
1990 1.71 1.69 1.60 1.50
1991 1.64 1.65 1.47 1.30
1992 1.74 1.75 1.70 1.44
1993 2.03 2.04 1.98 1.68
1994 1.83 1.84 1.79 1.51
Note: Regional prices have been calculated as a production weighted average of State prices.
Source: EIA/DOE "Natural Gas Annual" Report
Table C-ld: Natural Gas Prices Relative to Central States
Year Texas, Louis., Central States Rockies, New Mex.
Gulf
1978 1.08 1.00 1.15
1979 1.17 1.00 1.30
1980 1.23 1.00 1.34
1981 1.19 1.00 1.33
1982 0.95 1.00 1.10
1983 0.98 1.00 1.13
1984 1.04 1.00 1.20
1985 1.11 1.00 1.23
1986 1.14 1.00 1.27
1987 1.10 1.00 1.16
1988 1.08 1.00 1.10
1989 1.03 1.00 0.90
1990 1.06 1.00 0.94
1991 1.12 1.00 0.88
1992 1.03 1.00 0.85
Note: Regional prices have been calculated as a production weighted average of State prices.
Source: EIA/DOE "Natural Gas Annual" Report
a
I
Table C-le: Proven Reserves to Production Ratios - Crude Oil
Year All Regions Texas, Louis., Central Rockies,
Gulf States N. Mex.
1981 9.4 7.9 6.0 6.4
1982 8.8 7.5 5.9 6.9
1983 8.8 7.4 5.6 7.2
1984 8.8 7.2 5.5 7.0
1985 8.7 7.5 5.7 7.2
1986 8.5 7.2 5.5 7.1
1987 9.0 7.6 5.9 7.9
1988 9.0 7.9 6.0 7.8
1989 9.5 8.5 6.5 8.7
1990 9.8 8.8 6.2 8.9
1991 9.1 8.3 8.7 8.7
1992 9.0 8.2 6.4 8.7
1993 9.2 8.3 6.5 8.8
1994 9.4 8.6 6.7 9.1
Note: End year reserves divided by annual production.
Source: EIA/DOE "Petroleum Supply Annual" Report
EIA/DOE "Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquid Reserves Annual
Reports"
Table C-1f: Proven Reserves to Production Ratios - Natural Gas
Year All Regions Texas, Louis., Central Rockies,
Gulf States N. Mex.
1978 10.4 13.7 9.9 7.4
1979 9.8 7.1 9.3 7.4
1980 9.9 6.9 8.9 6.8
1981 10.1 7.1 9.5 6.4
1982 10.8 7.5 10.9 6.3
1983 11.9 8.2 11.8 5.8
1984 10.8 7.6 10.4 6.5
1985 11.2 8.1 10.2 6.1
1986 11.4 7.8 11.2 5.2
1987 10.7 7.2 10.9 6.0
1988 9.4 7.1 9.8 5.1
1989 9.2 7.2 9.3 5.9
1990 9.1 6.9 9.2 6.3
1991 9.0 6.7 8.8 6.3
1992 8.8 6.5 8.9 6.9
1993 8.5 6.3 8.6 6.6
1994 8.4 6.2 8.4 6.5
Note: End year reserves divided by annual production.
Source: EIA/DOE "Natural Gas Annual" Report
EIA/DOE "Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquid Reserves Annual
Reports"
Table C-lg: Regression Results for Transactions with Information on R/ P Ratios
Year Oil Gas Obs.
($/bbl) ($/mcf)
a, a2  a, a2
1987 5.91 -0.22 1.10 -0.08 7
(5.73) (-2.05) (5.40) (-1.58)
1988 17.11 -2.93 1.15 -0.09 8
(11.37) (-7.72) (3.26) (-.42)
1989 14.14 -2.01 0.92 -0.01 11
(2.31) (-1.56) (4.10) (-.23)
1990 ... ... ... 5
1991 -2.12 2.53 1.25 -0.1 8
(-.35) (1.12) (6.17) (-2.38)
1992 1.94 0.30 1.09 -0.12 16
(1.65) (.77) (3.74) (-1.55)
1993 2.98 -0.07 1.19 -0.09 32
(6.44) (-1.38) (28.97) (-8.24)
1994 9.30 -1.20 2.15 -0.29 10
(.60) (-.19) (8.14) (-3.86)
Since the year 1990 has only five observations and the regression is in four variables, there are insufficient data.
Table C-2a: Oil Reserve Regression Coefficient and Annual Price Data
($ / bbl)
Year Oil US US Price US Price
Regression Current Price Lagged 1 Year Lagged 2 Years
Coefficient ($/bbl) ($/bbl) ($/bbl)
($/bbl)
1980 6.30 21.59 12.64 9.00
1981 5.22 31.77 21.59 12.64
1982 5.71 28.52 31.77 21.59
1983 2.75 26.19 28.52 31.77
1984 7.53 25.88 26.19 28.52
1985 1.15 24.09 25.88 26.19
1986 5.68 12.51 24.09 25.88
1987 3.84 15.40 12.51 24.09
1988 5.52 12.58 15.40 12.51
1989 5.05 115.86 12.58 15.40
1990 4.58 20.03 115.86 12.58
1991 5.18 16.54 20.03 115.86
1992 3.61 15.99 16.54 20.03
Source: EIA/DOE "Natural Gas Annual" Report
EIA/DOE "Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquid Reserves Annual
Reports"
Table C-2b: Regression Results of Oil Reserve Coefficient Against Field Price (No Constant)
Coef t-stat Adj. R square No. of Obs
($/bbl)
Contemporary Price 0.09 3.49 0.46 13
Price lagged 1 yr 0.09 3.23 0.42 13
Price lagged 2 yrs 0.09 3.22 0.419 13
Table C-2c: Regression Results of Oil Reserve Coefficient Against Field Price (Constant Included)
Constant t-stat Coef t-stat Adj. R 2  No. of Obs
($/bbl) ($/bbl)
Contemporary Price 4.70 6.72 0.003 0.16 -0.09 13
Price lagged 1 yr 4.88 7.03 -0.003 -.019 -0.09 13
Price lagged 2 yrs 4.80 7.04 -0.001 -0.04 -0.09 13
Table C-3a: Gas Reserve Regression Coefficient and Annual Price Data
($ / mcf)
Year Gas US US Price US Price
Regression Current Price Lagged 1 Year Lagged 2 Years
Coefficient ($/mcf) ($/mcf) ($/mcf)
($/mcf)
1980 1.48 1.59 1.18 0.91
1981 1.64 1.98 1.59 1.18
1982 0.28 2.46 1.98 1.59
1983 1.39 2.59 2.46 1.98
1984 1.05 2.66 2.59 2.46
1985 1.57 2.51 2.66 2.59
1986 0.94 1.94 2.51 2.66
1987 1.10 1.67 1.94 2.51
1988 0.72 1.69 1.67 1.94
1989 0.94 1.69 1.69 1.67
1990 0.84 1.71 1.69 1.69
1991 0.94 1.64 1.71 1.69
1992 0.65 1.74 1.64 1.71
Source: EIA/DOE "Natural Gas Annual" Report
EIA/DOE "Crude, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquid Reserves Annual Reports"
Table C-3b: Regression Results of Gas Reserve Coefficient Against Field Price (No Constant)
Coef t-stat Adj. R2  No. of Obs
I ($/mcf)
Contemporary Price 0.51 8.82 0.89 13
Price lagged 1 yr I 0.51 8.40 0.84 13
Price lagged 2 yrs 0.51 7.23 0.80 13
Table C-3c: Regression Results of Gas Reserve Coefficient Against Field Price (Constant Included)
Constant t-stat Coef t-stat Adj. R 2  No. of Obs
($/mcf) ($/mcf)
Contemporary Price 0.79 1.35 0.13 0.44 -0.07 13
Price lagged 1 yr 0.86 1.69 0.09 0.37 -0.08 13
Price lagged 2 yrs 1.11 2.58 -0.04 -0.16 -0.09 13
Regression Results f 
s
Year Constant t-stat Oil Coeff. t-stat Gas Coeff. t-stat Obs.
($/bbl) ($/mcf)
1989 -0.06 -0.14 4.19 7.37 0.67 8.13 49
1990 0.28 1.53 3.75 9.49 0.57 9.44 77
1991 0.05 0.20 5.60 7.70 0.55 4.71 48
1992 -0.10 -0.33 3.70 7.17 0.75 8.27 43
1993 -0.23 -0.60 5.44 9.60 0.60 7.90 61
1994 -0.72 -0.73 5.99 5.41 1.04 5.73 42
Table C-4b: Regression Results for Large Transactions Only, Excluding Outliers
Year Constant t-stat Oil Coeff. t-stat Gas Coeff. t-stat Obs.
($/bbl) ($/mcf)
1989 -0.70 -1.33 5.25 8.40 0.98 10.42 49
1990 -0.32 -0.02 4.58 51.12 0.84 37.13 77
1991 -3.59 -2.26 5.30 18.48 0.96 24.89 48
1992 2.64 1.13 3.51 9.97 0.64 30.14 43
1993 -1.69 -0.46 4.05 6.75 0.82 21.46 61
1994 -5.16 -2.06 5.18 12.13 0.80 18.10 42
42 "Small" and "Large" determined by whether the size of transaction measured by thermal equivalence of
reserves was less than or greater than the median for the year, respectively.
. . . . .
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C-4a:
Appendix D: Hotelling Values and Implicit Price Expectations
Table D-la: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Oil, National Averages
(1)
YEAR P/R Ratio
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
00 1993
A 1994
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
(2)
Adjusted
Ratio (a)
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(3)
Reserve Price
(b)
$/bbl
5.22
5.71
2.75
7.53
1.14
5.68
3.84
5.52
5.05
4.58
5.18
3.61
4.00
4.84
(4)
SE of Reserve
Price
$/bbl
6.00
1.78
0.47
0.56
0.27
0.44
0.17
0.08
0.41
0.06
0.20
0.23
0.39
0.29
(5)
Operating Cost
(c)
$/bbl
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
(6)
Field Price (p)
$/bbl
31.77
28.52
26.19
25.88
24.09
12.51
15.40
12.58
15.86
20.03
16.54
15.99
14.25
13.19
(7)
Implicit Price
Growth Rate
-0.27
-0.19
-0.57
-0.05
-1.57
0.09
-0.05
0.09
0.02
-0.08
0.01
-0.09
-0.01
0.06
(8)
Net Field
Price: HV
$/bbl
28.05
24.80
22.47
22.16
20.37
8.79
11.68
8.86
12.14
16.31
12.82
12.27
10.53
9.47
. (9)
Ratio of HV to
Reserve Price
5.37
4.34
8.17
2.94
17.87
1.55
3.04
1.61
2.40
3.56
2.47
3.40
2.63
1.96
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-le.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-2b.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b, Table B-2b.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-la.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) + Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] -- Column (4).
(10)
HV Spread
3.81
10.70
42.16
25.98
70.00
7.01
47.45
42.22
17.17
189.78
38.16
37.57
16.90
15.80
Table D-lb: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Pure Oil, National Averages
(1)
YEAR P/R Ratio
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
(2)
Adjusted
Ratio (a)
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(3)
Reserve Price(b)
$/bbl
8.00
7.11
10.18
6.86
1.64
8.86
3.75
5.51
4.71
4.45
4.66
3.46
3.46
4.54
(4)
SE of Reserve
Price
$/bbl
1.54
(1 obs)
3.34
1.02
5.51
1.95
2.02
2.83
1.73
2.01
2.22
2.64
4.21
7.32
(5)
Operating Cost
(c)
$/bbl
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
(6)
Field Price
(p)
$/bbl
31.77
28.52
26.19
25.88
24.09
12.51
15.40
12.58
15.86
20.03
16.54
15.99
14.25
13.19
(7)
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
-0.09
-0.10
0.03
-0.07
-1.01
0.15
-0.06
0.09
0.00
-0.09
-0.02
-0.10
-0.05
0.05
(8)
Net Field Price:
HV
$/bbl
28.05
24.80
22.47
22.16
20.37
8.79
11.68
8.86
12.14
16.31
12.82
12.27
10.53
9.47
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-le.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-2f.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-la.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) + Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] + Column (4).
. (9)
Ratio of HV
to Reserve
Price
3.51
3.49
2.21
3.23
12.42
0.99
3.11
1.61
2.58
3.67
2.75
3.55
3.04
2.09
(10)
HV Spread
13.06
(1 obs)
3.68
15.04
3.40
-0.04
3.92
1.19
4.30
5.90
3.67
3.34
1.68
0.67
Table D-1c: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Gas, National Averages
(1)
YEAR P/R Ratio
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
19931994
1994
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
(2)
Adjusted
Ratio (a)
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(3)
Reserve Price
(b)
$/mcf
1.64
0.28
1.39
1.05
1.57
0.94
1.10
0.72
0.94
0.84
0.94
0.65
0.82
0.76
(4)
SE of Reserve
Price
$/mcf
0.55
0.21
0.08
0.06
0.21
0.05
0.07
0.04
0.06
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.03
(5)
Operating Cost
(c)
$/mcf
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
(6)
Field Price
(p)
$/mcf
1.98
2.46
2.59
2.66
2.51
1.94
1.67
1.69
1.69
1.71
1.64
1.74
2.03
1.83
(7)
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
0.20
-0.14
0.14
0.07
0.12
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.12
0.10
0.12
0.05
0.10
0.07
(8)
Net Field Price:
HV
$/mcf
1.57
2.05
2.18
2.25
2.10
1.53
1.26
1.28
1.28
1.30
1.23
1.33
1.62
1.42
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-If.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-2b.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b, Table B-2b.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-lc.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) - Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] + Column (4).
(9)
Ratio of HV
to Reserve
Price
0.96
7.32
1.57
2.14
1.34
1.63
1.15
1.78
1.36
1.54
1.31
2.05
1.98
1.87
(10)
HV Spread
-0.13
0.08
9.88
20.00
2.52
11.80
2.29
14.00
5.67
46.00
9.67
68.00
16.67
22.00
Table D-1d: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Pure Gas, National Averages
(1)
YEAR P/R Ratio
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
0 1994
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
(2)
Adjusted
Ratio (a)
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(3)
Reserve Price
(b)
$/mcf
0.00
0.00
1.04
1.32
0.82
0.62
0.89
0.64
1.18
0.81
0.90
0.66
0.71
0.76
(4)
SE of Reserve
Price
$/mcf
0.00
0.00
1.05
1.32
5.47
0.72
0.89
0.66
0.96
0.81
0.88
0.56
0.63
1.00
(5)
Operating Cost
(c)
$/mcf
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
(6)
Field Price
(p)
$/mcf
1.98
2.46
2.59
2.66
2.51
1.94
1.67
1.69
1.69
1.71
1.64
1.74
2.03
1.83
(7)
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
0.10
0.10
0.02
-0.07
0.04
0.04
0.14
0.10
0.11
0.06
0.08
0.07
(8)
Net Field Price:
HV
$/mcf
1.57
2.05
2.18
2.25
2.10
1.53
1.26
1.28
1.28
1.30
1.23
1.33
1.62
1.42
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C- If.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-2g.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-1c.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) - Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] - Column (4).
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. (9)
Ratio of HV
to Reserve
Price
0.00
0.00
2.10
1.70
2.56
2.47
1.42
2.00
1.08
1.60
1.37
2.02
2.28
1.87
(10)
HV Spread
0.00
0.00
1.09
0.70
0.23
1.26
0.42
0.97
0.10
0.60
0.38
1.20
1.44
0.66
Table D-le: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Oil Regional Breakdown
(10)
OIL - TEXAS, LOUIS.
YEAR P/R Ratio Adjusted
Ratio (a)
1989
1990
1991
1992
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
Reserve Price(b)
$/bbl
2.00
4.42
4.76
2.94
SE of
Reserve
Price
$/bbl
2.36
0.22
0.36
0.79
Operating Cost
(c)
$/bbl
3.49
3.49
3.49
3.49
Field Price
(p)
$/bbl
17.89
22.47
19.28
18.42
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
-0.43
-0.15
-0.08
-0.25
Net Field Price:
HV
$/bbl
14.40
18.98
15.79
14.93
Ratio of HV to
Reserve Price
7.20
4.29
3.32
5.08
1990
REGION P/R Ratio Adjusted Reserve Price
0o Ratio (a) (b)
$/bbl
CENTRAL
ROCKIES,
NM
0.16
0.11
0.14
0.10
5.20
4.23
SE of
Reserve
Price
$/bbl
1.40
0.38
Operating Cost
(c)
$/bbl
3.84
3.68
Field Price
(p)
$/bbl
22.92
21.90
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
-0.21
-0.18
Net Field Price:
HV
$/bbl
19.08
18.22
Ratio of HV to
Reserve Price
3.67
4.31
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C- le.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-4a.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b, Table B-4a.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-la.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) - Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] + Column (4).
HV Spread
5.25
66.18
30.64
15.18
HV Spread
9.91
36.82
Table D-1f: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, Gas Regional Breakdown
(10)
GAS - TEXAS, LOUIS.
YEAR P/R Ratio Adjusted
Ratio (a)
1989
1990
1991
1992
0.12
0.11
0.12
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
Reserve Price
(b)
$/mcf
1.22
1.39
0.95
0.89
SE of
Reserve
Price
$/mcf
0.16
0.11
0.05
0.04
Operating Cost
(c)
$/mcf
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.36
Field Price
(p)
$/mcf
1.66
1.69
1.65
1.75
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
0.14
0.15
0.11
0.09
Net Field Price:
HV
$/mcf
1.30
1.33
1.29
1.39
Ratio of HV to
Reserve Price
1.07
0.96
1.36
1.57
1990
P/R Ratio Adjusted Reserve Price
Ratio (a) (b)
$/mcf
0.11
0.16
0.10
0.13
0.83
0.32
SE of
Reserve
Price
$/mcf
0.02
0.04
Operating Cost
(c)
$/mcf
0.44
0.52
Field Price
(p)
$/mcf
1.60
1.50
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
0.11
-0.12
Net Field Price:
HV
$/mcf
1.16
0.98
Ratio of HV to
Reserve Price
1.40
3.06
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C- f.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-4a.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b, Table B-4a.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-lc.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) + Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] + Column (4).
S REGION
CENTRAL
ROCKIES,
NM
HV Spread
0.53
-0.50
6.90
12.63
HV Spread
15.18
16.45
Table D-1g: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Oil, Using Reserve Prices Calculated With a Suppressed Constant
(1) (2)
YEAR P/R Ratio Adjusted
Ratio (a)
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(3)
Reserve Price
(b)
$/bbl
10.18
7.13
2.82
7.63
1.27
5.70
3.81
5.52
4.88
4.57
5.07
3.70
3.92
4.71
(4)
SE of
Reserve
Price
$/bbl
4.05
1.77
0.48
0.55
0.25
0.44
0.16
0.08
0.40
0.06
0.20
0.22
0.36
0.27
(5)
Operating Cost
(c)
$/bbl
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
3.72
(6)
Field Price
(p)
$/bbl
31.77
28.52
26.19
25.88
24.09
12.51
15.40
12.58
15.86
20.03
16.54
15.99
14.25
13.19
(7)
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
-0.017
-0.100
-0.552
-0.042
-1.380
0.094
-0.054
0.090
0.010
-0.085
0.000
-0.079
-0.013
0.054
(8)
Net Field Price:
HV
$/bbl
28.05
24.80
22.47
22.16
20.37
8.79
11.68
8.86
12.14
16.31
12.82
12.27
10.53
9.47
(9)
Ratio of HV to
Reserve Price
2.76
3.48
7.97
2.90
16.04
1.54
3.07
1.61
2.49
3.57
2.53
3.32
2.69
2.01
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-le.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-2c.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b, Table B-2c.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-la.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) + Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] + Column (4).
(10)
HV Spread
4.41
9.96
40.83
26.53
76.10
6.97
48.46
43.41
18.31
193.52
39.21
39.70
18.41
17.66
Table D-1h: Estimates of Hotelling Values and Price Expectations, All Gas, Using Reserve Prices Calculated with a Suppressed Constant
(1) (2)
YEAR P/R Ratio Adjusted
Ratio (a)
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
(3)
Reserve
Price (b)
$/mcf
1.97
0.36
1.43
1.08
1.72
0.95
1.07
0.71
0.90
0.84
0.92
0.65
0.82
0.75
(4)
SE of
Reserve
Price
$/mcf
0.48
0.23
0.08
0.06
0.16
0.05
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
(5) (6)
Operating Field Price
Cost (c) (p)
$/mcf $/mcf
0.41 1.98
0.41 2.46
0.41 - 2.59
0.41 2.66
0.41 2.51
0.41 1.94
0.41 1.67
0.41 1.69
0.41 1.69
0.41 1.71
0.41 1.64
0.41 1.74
0.41 2.03
0.41 1.83
(7)
Implicit
Price
Growth Rate
0.206
-0.056
0.141
0.075
0.130
0.035
0.072
0.058
0.116
0.101
0.112
0.053
0.101
0.073
Sources
(1) Production/Reserves Ratio, P/R, Table C-If.
(2) Adjusted Ratio, (a), see text.
(3) Reserve Price, b, Table B-2c.
(4) Standard Error of reserve price, b, Table B-2c.
(5) Operating Cost, c, see text.
(6) Field Price, p, Table C-1c.
(7) Implicit Price Growth Rate, see text.
(8) Net Field Price, p-c, Column (6) - Column (5).
(9) HV to Reserve Price, Column (8) i- Column (3).
(10) HV Spread, [Column (8) - Column (3)] + Column (4).
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(8)
Net Field
Price: HV
$/mcf
1.57
2.05
2.18
2.25
2.10
1.53
1.26
1.28
1.28
1.30
1.23
1.33
1.62
1.42
(9)
Ratio of HV
to Reserve
Price
0.80
5.69
1.52
2.08
1.22
1.61
1.17
1.80
1.42
1.55
1.33
2.05
1.97
1.89
(10)
HV Spread
-0.83
7.35
9.38
19.50
2.38
11.60
3.17
19.00
7.60
46.00
15.50
68.00
4.00
22.33
